the critique of judgement-第3节

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w；　they　are　not　themselves　legislative；　but　the　rules　founded　on　them　are　empirical　and；　consequently；　contingent。　　　Our　entire　faculty　of　cognition　has　two　realms；　that　of　natural　concepts　and　that　of　the　concept　of　freedom；　for　through　both　it　prescribes　laws　a　priori。　In　accordance　with　this　distinction；　then；　philosophy　is　divisible　into　theoretical　and　practical。　But　the　territory　upon　which　its　realm　is　established；　and　over　which　it　exercises　its　legislative　authority；　is　still　always　confined　to　the　complex　of　the　objects　of　all　possible　experience；　taken　as　no　more　than　mere　phenomena；　for　otherwise　legislation　by　the　understanding　in　respect　of　them　is　unthinkable。　　　The　function　of　prescribing　laws　by　means　of　concepts　of　nature　is　discharged　by　understanding　and　is　theoretical。　That　of　prescribing　laws　by　means　of　the　concept　of　freedom　is　discharged　by　reason　and　is　merely　practical。　It　is　only　in　the　practical　sphere　that　reason　can　prescribe　laws；　in　respect　of　theoretical　knowledge　（of　nature）　it　can　only　（as　by　the　understanding　advised　in　the　law）　deduce　from　given　logical　consequences；　which　still　always　remain　restricted　to　nature。　But　we　cannot　reverse　this　and　say　that　where　rules　are　practical　reason　is　then　and　there　legislative；　since　the　rules　might　be　technically　practical。　　　Understanding　and　reason；　therefore；　have　two　distinct　jurisdictions　over　one　and　the　same　territory　of　experience。　But　neither　can　interfere　with　the　other。　For　the　concept　of　freedom　just　as　little　disturbs　the　legislation　of　nature；　as　the　concept　of　nature　influences　legislation　through　the　concept　of　freedom。　That　it　is　possible　for　us　at　least　to　think　without　contradiction　of　both　these　jurisdictions；　and　their　appropriate　faculties；　as　co…existing　in　the　same　subject；　was　shown　by　the　Critique　of　Pure　Reason；　since　it　disposed　of　the　objections　on　the　other　side　by　detecting　their　dialectical　illusion。　　　Still；　how　does　it　happen　that　these　two　different　realms　do　not　form　one　realm；　seeing　that；　while　they　do　not　limit　each　other　in　their　legislation；　they　continually　do　so　in　their　effects　in　the　sensible　world？　The　explanation　lies　in　the　fact　that　the　concept　of　nature　represents　its　objects　in　intuition　doubtless；　yet　not　as　things　in…themselves；　but　as　mere　phenomena；　whereas　the　concept　of　freedom　represents　in　its　object　what　is　no　doubt　a　thing…in…itself；　but　it　does　not　make　it　intuitable；　and　further　that　neither　the　one　nor　the　other　is　capable；　therefore；　of　furnishing　a　theoretical　cognition　of　its　object　（or　even　of　the　thinking　subject）　as　a　thing…in…itself；　or；　as　this　would　be；　of　the　supersensible　idea　of　which　has　certainly　to　be　introduced　as　the　basis　of　the　possibility　of　all　those　objects　of　experience；　although　it　cannot　itself　ever　be　elevated　or　extended　into　a　cognition。　　　Our　entire　cognitive　faculty　is；　therefore；　presented　with　an　unbounded；　but；　also；　inaccessible　field…the　field　of　the　supersensible…in　which　we　seek　in　vain　for　a　territory；　and　on　which；　therefore；　we　can　have　no　realm　for　theoretical　cognition；　be　it　for　concepts　of　understanding　or　of　reason。　This　field　we　must　indeed　occupy　with　ideas　in　the　interest　as　well　of　the　theoretical　as　the　practical　employment　of　reason；　but；　in　connection　with　the　laws　arising　from　the　concept　of　freedom；　we　cannot　procure　for　these　ideas　any　but　practical　reality；　which；　accordingly；　fails　to　advance　our　theoretical　cognition　one　step　towards　the　supersensible。　　　Albeit；　then；　between　the　realm　of　the　natural　concept；　as　the　sensible；　and　the　realm　of　the　concept　of　freedom；　as　the　supersensible；　there　is　a　great　gulf　fixed；　so　that　it　is　not　possible　to　pass　from　the　to　the　latter　（by　means　of　the　theoretical　employment　of　reason）；　just　as　if　they　were　so　many　separate　worlds；　the　first　of　which　is　powerless　to　exercise　influence　on　the　second：　still　the　latter　is　meant　to　influence　the　former…that　is　to　say；　the　concept　of　freedom　is　meant　to　actualize　in　the　sensible　world　the　end　proposed　by　its　laws；　and　nature　must　consequently　also　be　capable　of　being　regarded　in　such　a　way　that　in　the　conformity　to　law　of　its　form　it　at　least　harmonizes　with　the　possibility　of　the　ends　to　be　effectuated　in　it　according　to　the　laws　of　freedom。　There　must；　therefore；　be　a　ground　of　the　unity　of　the　supersensible　that　lies　at　the　basis　of　nature；　with　what　the　concept　of　freedom　contains　in　a　practical　way；　and　although　the　concept　of　this　ground　neither　theoretically　nor　practically　attains　to　a　knowledge　of　it；　and　so　has　no　peculiar　realm　of　its　own；　still　it　renders　possible　the　transition　from　the　mode　of　thought　according　to　the　principles　of　the　one　to　that　according　to　the　principles　of　the　other。

　　　　　　　III。　The　Critique　of　Judgement　as　a　means　of　　　　　　　　　　　　connecting　the　two　Parts　of　Philosophy　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　in　a　whole。

　　The　critique　which　deals　with　what　our　cognitive　faculties　are　capable　of　yielding　a　priori　has　properly　speaking　no　realm　in　respect　of　objects；　for　it　is　not　a　doctrine；　its　sole　business　being　to　investigate　whether；　having　regard　to　the　general　bearings　of　our　faculties；　a　doctrine　is　possible　by　their　means；　and　if　so；　how。　Its　field　extends　to　all　their　pretentions；　with　a　view　to　confining　them　within　their　legitimate　bounds。　But　what　is　shut　out　of　the　division　of　philosophy　may　still　be　admitted　as　a　principal　part　into　the　general　critique　of　our　faculty　of　pure　cognition；　in　the　event；　namely；　of　its　containing　principles　which　are　not　in　themselves　available　either　for　theoretical　or　practical　employment。　　　Concepts　of　nature　contain　the　ground　of　all　theoretical　cognition　a　priori　and　rest；　as　we　saw；　upon　the　legislative　authority　of　understanding。　The　concept　of　freedom　contains　the　ground　of　all　sensuously　unconditioned　practical　precepts　a　priori；　and　rests　upon　that　of　reason。　Both　faculties；　therefore；　besides　their　application　in　point　of　logical　form　to　principles　of　whatever　origin；　have；　in　addition；　their　own　peculiar　jurisdiction　in　the　matter　of　their　content；　and　so；　there　being　no　further　（a　priori）　jurisdiction　above　them；　the　division　of　philosophy　into　theoretical　and　practical　is　justified。　　　But　there　is　still　further　in　the　family　of　our　higher　cognitive　faculties　a　middle　term　between　understanding　and　reason。　This　is　judgement；　of　which　we　may　reasonably　presume　by　analogy　that　it　may　likewise　contain；　if　not　a　special　authority　to　prescribe　laws；　still　a　principle　peculiar　to　itself　upon　which　laws　are　sought；　although　one　merely　subjective　a　priori。　This　principle；　even　if　it　has　no　field　of　objects　appropriate　to　it　as　its　realm；　may　still　have　some　territory　or　other　with　a　certain　character；　for　which　just　this　very　principle　alone　may　be　valid。　　　But　in　addition　to　the　above　considerations　there　is　yet　（to　judge　by　analogy）　a　further　ground；　upon　which　judgement　may　be　brought　into　line　with　another　arrangement　of　our　powers　of　representation；　and　one　that　appears　to　be　of　even　greater　importance　than　that　of　its　kinship　with　the　family　of　cognitive　faculties。　For　all　faculties　of　the　soul；　or　capacities；　are　reducible　to　three；　which　do　not　admit　of　any　further　derivation　from　a　common　ground：　the　faculty　of　knowledge；　the　feeling　of　pleasure　or　displeasure；　and　the　faculty　of　desire。*　For　the　faculty　of　cognition　understanding　alone　is　legislative；　if　（as　must　be　the　case　where　it　is　considered　on　its　own　account　free　of　confusion　with　the　faculty　of　desire）　this　faculty；　as　that　of　theoretical　cognition；　is　referred　to　nature；　in　respect　of　which　alone　（as　phenomenon）　it　is　possible　for　us　to　prescribe　laws　by　means　of　a　priori　concepts　of　nature；　which　are　properly　pure　concepts　of　understanding。　For　the　faculty　of　desire；　as　a　higher　faculty　operating　under　the　concept　of　freedom；　only　reason　（in　which　alone　this　concept　has　a　place）　prescribes　laws　a　priori。　Now　between　the　faculties　of　knowledge　and　desire　stands　the　feeling　of　pleasure；　just　as　judgement　is　intermediate　between　understanding　and　reason。　Hence　we　may；　provisionally　at　least；　assume　that　judgement　likewise　contains　an　a　priori　principle　of　its　own；　and　that；　since　pleasure　or　displeasure　is　necessarily　combined　with　the　faculty　of　desire　（be　it　antecedent　to　its　principle；　as　with　the　lower　desires；　or；　as　with　the　higher；　only　supervening　upon　its　determination　by　the　moral　law）；　it　will　effect　a　transition　from　the　faculty　of　pure　knowledge；　i。e。；　from　the　realm　of　concepts　of　nature；　to　that　of　the　concept　of　freedom；　just　as　i　its　logical　employment　it　makes　possible　the　transition　from　understanding　to　reason。

　　*Where　one　has　reason　to　suppose　that　a　relation　subsists　between　concepts　that　are　used　as　empirical　principles　and　the　faculty　of　pure　cognition　a　priori；　it　is　worth　while　attempting；　in　consideration　of　this　connection；　to　give　them　a　transcendental　definition…a　definition；　that　is；　by　pure　categories；　so　far　as　these　by　themselves　adequately　indicate　the　distinction　of　the　concept　in　question　from　others。　This　course　follows　that　of　the　mathematician；　who　leaves　the　empirical　data　of　his　problem　indeterminate；　and　only　brings　their　relation　in　pure　synthesis　under　the　concepts　of　pure