the critique of judgement-第29节

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t　coincidence　of　their　judgements　is　to　be　held　over　us　as　commanding　our　assent。　But　this　principle　we　would　presumably　resent；　and　appeal　to　our　natural　right　of　submitting　a　judgement　to　our　own　sense；　where　it　rests　upon　the　immediate　feeling　of　personal　well…being；　instead　of　submitting　it　to　that　of　others。　　　Hence　if　the　import　of　the　judgement　of　taste；　where　we　appraise　it　as　a　judgement　entitled　to　require　the　concurrence　of　every　one；　cannot　be　egoistic；　but　must　necessarily；　from　its　inner　nature；　be　allowed　a　pluralistic　validity；　i。e。；　on　account　of　what　taste　itself　is；　and　not　on　account　of　the　examples　which　others　give　of　their　taste；　then　it　must　found　upon　some　a　priori　principle　（be　it　subjective　or　objective）；　and　no　amount　of　prying　into　the　empirical　laws　of　the　changes　that　go　on　within　the　mind　can　succeed　in　establishing　such　a　principle。　For　these　laws　only　yield　a　knowledge　of　how　we　do　judge；　but　they　do　not　give　us　a　command　as　to　how　we　ought　to　judge；　and；　what　is　more；　such　a　command　as　is　unconditioned…and　commands　of　this　kind　are　presupposed　by　judgements　of　taste；　inasmuch　as　they　require　delight　to　be　taken　as　immediately　connected　with　a　representation。　Accordingly；　though　the　empirical　exposition　of　aesthetic　judgements　may　be　a　first　step　towards　accumulating　the　material　for　a　higher　investigation；　yet　a　transcendental　examination　of　this　faculty　is　possible；　and　forms　an　essential　part　of　the　Critique　of　Taste。　For；　were　not　taste　in　possession　of　a　priori　principles；　it　could　not　possibly　sit　in　judgement　upon　the　judgements　of　others　and　pass　sentence　of　commendation　or　condemnation　upon　them；　with　even　the　least　semblance　of　authority。　　　The　remaining　part　of　the　Analytic　of　the　aesthetic　judgement　contains　first　of　all　the：

　　　　　　　　　　　　Deduction　of　Pure　Aesthetic　Judgements。　　　　　SS　30。　The　deduction　of　aesthetic　judgements　upon　objects　of　　　　　　　nature　must　not　be　directed　to　what　we　call　sublime　in　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　nature；　but　only　to　the　beautiful。

　　The　claim　of　an　aesthetic　judgement　to　universal　validity　for　every　subject；　being　a　judgement　which　must　rely　on　some　a　priori　principle；　stands　in　need　of　a　deduction　（i。e。；　a　derivation　of　its　title）。　Further；　where　the　delight　or　aversion　turns　on　the　form　of　the　object　this　has　to　be　something　over　and　above　the　exposition　of　the　judgement。　Such　is　the　case　with　judgements　of　taste　upon　the　beautiful　in　nature。　For　there　the　finality　has　its　foundation　in　the　object　and　its　outward　form…although　it　does　not　signify　the　reference　of　this　to　other　objects　according　to　concepts　（for　the　purpose　of　cognitive　judgements）；　but　is　merely　concerned　in　general　with　the　apprehension　of　this　form　so　far　as　it　proves　accordant　in　the　mind　with　the　faculty　of　concepts　as　well　as　with　that　of　their　presentation　（which　is　identical　with　that　of　apprehension）。　With　regard　to　the　beautiful　in　nature；　therefore；　we　may　start　a　number　of　questions　touching　the　cause　of　this　finality　of　their　forms　e。g。；　how　we　are　to　explain　why　nature　has　scattered　beauty　abroad　with　so　lavish　a　hand　even　in　the　depth　of　the　ocean　where　it　can　but　seldom　be　reached　by　the　eye　of　man…for　which　alone　it　is。　final？　　　But　the　sublime　in　nature…if　we　pass　upon　it　a　pure　aesthetic　judgement　unmixed　with　concepts　of　perfection；　as　objective　finality；　which　would　make　the　judgement　teleological…may　be　regarded　as　completely　wanting　in　form　or　figure；　and　none　the　less　be　looked　upon　as　an　object　of　pure　delight；　and　indicate　a　subjective　finality　of　the　given　representation。　So；　now；　the　question　suggests　itself；　whether　in　addition　to　the　exposition　of　what　is　thought　in　an　aesthetic　judgement　of　this　kind；　we　may　be　called　upon　to　give　a　deduction　of　its　claim　to　some　（subjective）　a　priori　principle。　　　This　we　may　meet　with　the　reply　that　the　sublime　in　nature　is　improperly　so　called；　and　that　sublimity　should；　in　strictness；　be　attributed　merely　to　the　attitude　of　thought；　or；　rather；　to　that　which　serves　as　basis　for　this　in　human　nature。　The　apprehension　of　an　object　otherwise　formless　and　in　conflict　with　ends　supplies　the　mere　occasion　for　our　coming　to　a　consciousness　of　this　basis；　and　the　object　is　in　this　way　put　to　a　subjectively…final　use；　but　it　is　not　estimated　as　subjectively…final　on　its　own　account　and　because　of　its　form。　（It　is；　as　it　were；　a　species　finalis　accepta；　non　data。）　Consequently　the　exposition　we　gave　of　judgements　upon　the　sublime　in　nature　was　at　the　same　time　their　deduction。　For；　in　our　analysis　of　the　reflection　on　the　part　of　judgement　in　this　case；　we　found　that　in　such　judgements　there　is　a　final　relation　of　the　cognitive　faculties；　which　has　to　be　laid　a　priori　at　the　basis　of　the　faculty　of　ends　（the　will）；　and　which　is　therefore　itself　a　priori　final。　This；　then；　at　once　involves　the　deduction；　i。e。；　the　justification　of　the　claim　of　such　a　judgement　to　universally…necessary　validity。　　　Hence　we　may　confine　our　search　to　one　for　the　deduction　of　judgements　of　taste；　i。e。；　of　judgements　upon　the　beauty　of　things　of　nature；　and　this　will　satisfactorily　dispose　of　the　problem　for　the　entire　aesthetic　faculty　of　judgement。

　　　　　　　SS　31。　Of　the　method　of　the　deduction　of　judgements　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　of　taste。

　　The　obligation　to　furnish　a　deduction；　i。e。；　a　guarantee　of　the　legitimacy　of　judgements　of　a　particular　kind；　only　arises　where　the　judgement　lays　claim　to　necessity。　This　is　the　case　even　where　it　requires　subjective　universality；　i。e。；　the　concurrence　of　every　one；　albeit　the　judgement　is　not　a　cognitive　judgement；　but　only　one　of　pleasure　or　displeasure　in　a　given　object；　i。e。；　an　assumption　of　a　subjective　finality　that　has　a　thoroughgoing　validity　for　every　one；　and　which；　since　the　judgement　is　one　of　taste；　is　not　to　be　grounded　upon　any　concept　of　the　thing。　　　Now；　in　the　latter　case；　we　are　not　dealing　with　a　judgement　of　cognition…neither　with　a　theoretical　one　based　on　the　concept　of　a　nature　in　general；　supplied　by　understanding；　nor　with　a　（pure）　practical　one　based　on　the　idea　of　freedom；　as　given　a　priori　by　reason…and　so　we　are　not　called　upon　to　justify　a　priori　the　validity　of　a　judgement　which　represents　either　what　a　thing　is；　or　that　there　is　something　which　I　ought　to　do　in　order　to　produce　it。　Consequently；　if　for　judgement　generally　we　demonstrate　the　universal　validity　of　a　singular　judgement　expressing　the　subjective　finality　of　an　empirical　representation　of　the　form　of　an　object；　we　shall　do　all　that　is　needed　to　explain　how　it　is　possible　that　something　can　please　in　the　mere　formation　of　an　estimate　of　it　（without　sensation　or　concept）；　and　how；　just　as　the　estimate　of　an　object　for　the　sake　of　a　cognition　generally　has　universal　rules；　the　delight　of　any　one　person　may　be　pronounced　as　a　rule　for　every　other。　　　Now　if　this　universal　validity　is　not　to　be　based　on　a　collection　of　votes　and　interrogation　of　others　as　to　what　sort　of　sensations　they　experience；　but　is　to　rest；　as　it　were；　upon　an；　autonomy　of　the　subject　passing　judgement　on　the　feeling　of　pleasure　（in　the　given　representation）；　i。e。；　upon　his　own　taste；　and　yet　is　also　not　to　be　derived　from　concepts；　then　it　follows　that　such　a　judgement…and　such　the　judgement　of　taste　in　fact　is…has　a　double　and　also　logical　peculiarity。　For；　first；　it　has　universal　validity　a　priori；　yet　without　having　a　logical　universality　according　to　concepts；　but　only　the　universality　of　a　singular　judgement。　Secondly；　it　has　a　necessity　（which　must　invariably　rest　upon　a　priori　grounds）；　but　one　which　depends　upon　no　a　priori　proofs　by　the　representation　of　which　it　would　be　competent　to　enforce　the　assent　which　the　judgement　of　taste　demands　of　every　one。　　　The　solution　of　these　logical　peculiarities；　which　distinguish　a　judgement　of　taste　from　all　cognitive　judgements；　will　of　itself　suffice　for　a　deduction　of　this　strange　faculty；　provided　we　abstract　at　the　outset　from　all　content　of　the　judgement；　viz。；　from　the　feeling　of　pleasure；　and　merely　compare　the　aesthetic　form　with　the　form　of　objective　judgements　as　prescribed　by　logic。　We　shall　first　try；　with　the　help　of　examples；　to　illustrate　and　bring　out　these　characteristic　properties　of　taste。

　　　　　　　SS　32。　First　peculiarity　of　the　judgement　of　taste。

　　The　judgement　of　taste　determines　its　object　in　respect　of　delight　（as　a　thing　of　beauty）　with　a　claim　to　the　agreement　of　every　one；　just　as　if　it　were　objective。　　　To　say：　〃this　flower　is　beautiful　is　tantamount　to　repeating　its　own　proper　claim　to　the　delight　of　everyone。　The　agreeableness　of　its　smell　gives　it　no　claim　at　all。　One　man　revels　in　it；　but　it　gives　another　a　headache。　Now　what　else　are　we　to　suppose　from　this　than　that　its　beauty　is　to　be　taken　for　a　property　of　the　flower　itself　which　does　not　adapt　itself　to　the　diversity　of　heads　and　the　individual　senses　of　the　multitude；　but　to　which　they　must　adapt　themselves；　if　they　are　going　to　pass　judgement　upon　it。　And　yet　this　is　not　the　way　the　matter　stands。　For　the　judgement　of　taste　consists　precisely　in　a　thing　being　called　beautiful　solely　in　respect　of　that　quality　in　which　it　adapts　itself　to　our　mode　of　taking　it　in。　　　Besides；　every　judgement　which　is　to　show　the