the critique of judgement-第25节
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which a temper of calm reflection and a quite free judgement are required。 Only when he becomes conscious of having a disposition that is upright and acceptable to God； do those operations of might serve； to stir within him the idea of the sublimity of this Being； so far as he recognizes the existence in himself of a sublimity of disposition consonant with His will； and is thus raised above the dread of such operations of nature； in which he no longer sees God pouring forth the vials of the wrath。 Even humility； taking the form of an uncompromising judgement upon his shortcomings； which； with consciousness of good intentions； might readily be glossed over on the ground of the frailty of human nature； is a sublime temper of the mind voluntarily to undergo the pain of remorse as a means of more and more effectually eradicating its cause。 In this way religion is intrinsically distinguished from superstition； which latter rears in the mind； not reverence for the sublime； but dread and apprehension of the all…powerful Being to whose will terror…stricken man sees himself subjected； yet without according Him due honour。 From this nothing can arise but grace…begging and vain adulation； instead of a religion consisting in a good life。 Sublimity； therefore； does not reside in any of the things of nature； but only in our own mind； in so far as we may become conscious of our superiority over nature within； and thus also over nature without us （as exerting influence upon us）。 Everything that provokes this feeling in us； including the might of nature which challenges our strength； is then； though improperly； called sublime； and it is only under presupposition of this idea within us； and in relation to it； that we are capable of attaining to the idea of the sublimity of that Being Which inspires deep respect in us； not by the mere display of its might in nature； but more by the faculty which is planted in us of estimating that might without fear； and of regarding our estate as exalted above it。
SS 29。 Modality of the judgement on the sublime in nature。
Beautiful nature contains countless things as to which we at once take every one as in their judgement concurring with our own； and as to which we may further expect this concurrence without facts finding us far astray。 But in respect of our judgement upon the sublime in nature； we cannot so easily vouch for ready acceptance by others。 For a far higher degree of culture； not merely of the aesthetic judgement； but also of the faculties of cognition which lie at its basis； seems to be requisite to enable us to lay down a judgement upon this high distinction of natural objects。 The proper mental mood for a feeling of the sublime postulates the mind's susceptibility for ideas； since it is precisely in the failure of nature to attain to these… and consequently only under presupposition of this susceptibility and of the straining of the imagination to use nature as a schema for ideas… that there is something forbidding to sensibility； but which； for all that； has an attraction for us； arising from the fact of its being a dominion which reason exercises over sensibility with a view to extending it to the requirements of its own realm （the practical） and letting it look out beyond itself into the infinite； which for it is an abyss。 In fact； without the development of moral ideas； that which； thanks to preparatory culture； we call sublime； merely strikes the untutored man as terrifying。 He will see in the evidences which the ravages of nature give of her dominion； and in the vast scale of her might； compared with which his own is diminished to insignificance； only the misery； peril； and distress that would compass the man who was thrown to its mercy。 So the simpleminded； and； for the most part； intelligent； Savoyard peasant； （as Herr von Sassure relates）； unhesitatingly called all lovers of snow mountains fools。 And who can tell whether he would have been so wide of the mark； if that student of nature had taken the risk of the dangers to which he exposed himself merely； as most travellers do； for a fad； or so as some day to be able to give a thrilling account of his adventures？ But the mind of Sassure was bent on the instruction of mankind； and soul…stirring sensations that excellent man indeed had； and the reader of his travels got them thrown into the bargain。 But the fact that culture is requisite for the judgement upon the sublime in nature （more than for that upon the beautiful） does not involve its being an original product of culture and something introduced in a more or less conventional way into society。 Rather is it in human nature that its foundations are laid； and； in fact； in that which； at once with common understanding； we may expect every one to possess and may require of him； namely； a native capacity for the feeling for （practical） ideas； i。e。； for moral feeling。 This； now； is the foundation of the necessity of that agreement between other men's judgements upon the sublime and our own； which we make our own imply。 For just as we taunt a man who is quite inappreciative when forming an estimate of an object of nature in which we see beauty； with want of taste； so we say of a man who remains unaffected in the presence of what we consider sublime； that he has no feeling。 But we demand both taste and feeling of every man； and； granted some degree of culture； we give him credit for both。 Still； we do so with this difference： that； in the； case of the former； since judgement there refers the imagination merely to the understanding； as a the faculty of concepts； we make the requirement as a matter of course； whereas in the case of the latter； since here the judgement refers the imagination to reason； as a faculty of ideas； we do so only under a subjective presupposition （which； however； we believe we are warranted in making）； namely； that of the moral feeling in man。 And； on this assumption； we attribute necessity to the latter aesthetic judgement also。 In this modality of aesthetic judgements； namely； their assumed necessity； lies what is for the Critique of judgement a moment of capital importance。 For this is exactly what makes an a priori principle apparent in their case； and lifts them out of the sphere of empirical psychology； in which otherwise they would remain buried amid the feelings of gratification and pain （only with the senseless epithet of finer feeling）； so as to place them； and； thanks to them； to place the faculty of judgement itself； in the class of judgements of which the basis of an a priori principle is the distinguishing feature； and； thus distinguished； to introduce them into transcendental philosophy。
General Remark upon the Exposition of Aesthetic Reflective Judgements。
In relation to the feeling of pleasure an object is to be counted either as agreeable； or beautiful； or sublime； or good （absolutely）； （incundum； pulchrum； sublime； honestum）。 As the motive of desires the agreeable is invariably of one and the same kind； no matter what its source or how specifically different the representation （of sense and sensation objectively considered）。 Hence in estimating its influence upon the mind； the multitude of its charms （simultaneous or successive） is alone revelant； and so only； as it were； the mass of the agreeable sensation； and it is only by the quantity； therefore； that this can be made intelligible。 Further it in no way conduces to our culture； but belongs only to mere enjoyment。 The beautiful； on the other hand； requires the representation of a certain quality of the object； that pern…fits also of being understood and reduced to concepts （although in the aesthetic judgement it is not reduced）； and it cultivates； as it instructs us to attend to； finality in the feeling of pleasure。 The sublime consists merely in the relation exhibited by the estimate of the serviceability of the sensible in the representation of nature for a possible supersensible employment。 The absolutely good； estimated subjectively according to the feeling it inspires （the object of the moral feeling）； as the determinability of the powers of the subject by means of the representation of an absolutely necessitating law； is principally distinguished； by the modality of a necessity resting upon concepts a priori； and involving not a mere claim； but a command upon every one to assent； and belongs intrinsically not to the aesthetic； but to the pure intellectual judgement。 Further； it is not ascribed to nature but to freedom； and that in a determinant and not a merely reflective judgement。 But the determinability of the subject by means of this idea； and； what is more； that of a subject which can be sensible； in the way of a modification of its state； to hindrances on the part of sensibility； while； at the same time； it can by surmounting them feel superiority over them…a determinability； in other words； as moral feeling…is still so allied to aesthetic judgement and its formal conditions as to be capable of being pressed into the service of the aesthetic representation of the conformity to law of action from duty； i。e。； of the representation of this as sublime； or even as beautiful； without forfeiting its purity…an impossible r
