the critique of judgement-第19节

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　and　of　itself　conformable　to　law；　i。　e。；　carry　autonomy　with　it；　is　a　contradiction。　The　understanding　alone　gives　the　law。　Where；　however；　the　imagination　is　compelled　to　follow　a　course　laid　down　by　a　definite　law；　then　what　the　form　of　the　product　is　to　be　is　determined　by　concepts；　but；　in　that　case；　as　already　shown；　the　delight　is　not　delight　in　the　beautiful；　but　in　the　good　（in　perfection；　though　it　be　no　more　than　formal　perfection）；　and　the　judgement　is　not　one　due　to　taste。　Hence　it　is　only　a　conformity　to　law　without　a　law；　and　a　subjective　harmonizing　of　the　imagination　and　the　understanding　without　an　objective　one…which　latter　would　mean　that　the　representation　was　referred　to　a　definite　concept　of　the　object…that　can　consist　with　the　free　conformity　to　law　of　the　understanding　（which　has　also　been　called　finality　apart　from　an　end）　and　with　the　specific　character　of　a　judgement　of　taste。　　　Now　geometrically　regular　figures；　a　circle；　a　square；　a　cube；　and　the　like；　are　commonly　brought　forward　by　critics　of　taste　as　the　most　simple　and　unquestionable　examples　of　beauty。　And　yet　the　very　reason　why　they　are　called　regular；　is　because　the　only　way　of　representing　them　is　by　looking　on　them　as　mere　presentations　of　a　determinate　concept　by　which　the　figure　has　its　rule　（according　to　which　alone　it　is　possible）　prescribed　for　it。　One　or　other　of　these　two　views　must；　therefore；　be　wrong：　either　the　verdict　of　the　critics　that　attributes　beauty　to　such　figures；　or　else　our　own；　which　makes　finality　apart　from　any　concept　necessary　for　beauty。　　　One　would　scarce　think　it　necessary　for　a　man　to　have　taste　to　take　more　delight　in　a　circle　than　in　a　scrawled　outline；　in　an　equilateral　and　equiangular　quadrilateral　than　in　one　that　is　all　lop…sided；　and；　as　it　were；　deformed。　The　requirements　of　common　understanding　ensure　such　a　preference　without　the　least　demand　upon　taste。　Where　some　purpose　is　perceived；　as；　for　instance；　that　of　forming　an　estimate　of　the　area　of　a　plot　of　land；　or　rendering　intelligible　the　relation　of　divided　parts　to　one　another　and　to　the　whole；　then　regular　figures；　and　those　of　the　simplest　kind；　are　needed；　and　the　delight　does　not　rest　immediately　upon　the　way　the　figure　strikes　the　eye；　but　upon　its　serviceability　for　all　manner　of　possible　purposes。　A　room　with　the　walls　making　oblique　angles；　a　plot　laid　out　in　a　garden　in　a　similar　way；　even　any　violation　of　symmetry；　as　well　in　the　figure　of　animals　（e。g。；　being　one…eyed）　as　in　that　of　buildings；　or　of　flower…beds；　is　displeasing　because　of　its　perversity　of　form；　not　alone　in　a　practical　way　in　respect　of　some　definite　use　to　which　the　thing　may　be　put；　but　for　an　estimate　that　looks　to　all　manner　of　possible　purposes。　With　the　judgement　of　taste　the　case　is　different。　For；　when　it　is　pure；　it　combines　delight　or　aversion　immediately　with　the　bare　contemplation　of　the　object　irrespective　of　its　use　or　of　any　end。　　　The　regularity　that　conduces　to　the　concept　of　an　object　is；　in　fact；　the　indispensable　condition　（conditio　sine　qua　non）　of　grasping　the　object　as　a　single　representation　and　giving　to　the　manifold　its　determinate　form。　This　determination　is　an　end　in　respect　of　knowledge；　and　in　this　connection　it　is　invariably　coupled　with　delight　（such　as　attends　the　accomplishment　of　any；　even　problematical；　purpose）。　Here；　however；　we　have　merely　the　value　set　upon　the　solution　that　satisfies　the　problem；　and　not　a　free　and　indeterminately　final　entertainment　of　the　mental　powers　with　what　is　called　beautiful。　In　the　latter　case；　understanding　is　at　the　service　of　imagination；　in　the　former；　this　relation　is　reversed。　　　With　a　thing　that　owes　its　possibility　to　a　purpose；　a　building；　or　even　an　animal；　its　regularity；　which　consists　in　symmetry；　must　express　the　unity　of　the　intuition　accompanying　the　concept　of　its　end；　and　belongs　with　it　to　cognition。　But　where　all　that　is　intended　is　the　maintenance　of　a　free　play　of　the　powers　of　representation　（subject；　however；　to　the　condition　that　there　is　to　be　nothing　for　understanding　to　take　exception　to）；　in　ornamental　gardens；　in　the　decoration　of　rooms；　in　all　kinds　of　furniture　that　shows　good　taste；　etc。；　regularity　in　the　shape　of　constraint　is　to　be　avoided　as　far　as　possible。　Thus　English　taste　in　gardens；　and　fantastic　taste　in　furniture；　push　the　freedom　of　imagination　to　the　verge　of　what　is　grotesque　the　idea　being　that　in　this　divorce　from　all　constraint　of　rules　the　precise　instance　is　being　afforded　where　taste　can　exhibit　its　perfection　in　projects　of　the　imagination　to　the　fullest　extent。　　　All　stiff　regularity　（such　as　borders　on　mathematical　regularity）　is　inherently　repugnant　to　taste；　in　that　the　contemplation　of　it　affords　us　no　lasting　entertainment。　Indeed；　where　it　has　neither　cognition　nor　some　definite　practical　end　expressly　in　view；　we　get　heartily　tired　of　it。　On　the　other　hand；　anything　that　gives　the　imagination　scope　for　unstudied　and　final　play　is　always　fresh　to　us。　We　do　not　grow　to　hate　the　very　sight　of　it。　Marsden；　in　his　description　of　Sumatra；　observes　that　the　free　beauties　of　nature　so　surround　the　beholder　on　all　sides　that　they　cease　to　have　much　attraction　for　him。　On　the　other　band　he　found　a　pepper　garden　full　of　charm；　on　coming　across　it　in　mid…forest　with　its　rows　of　parallel　stakes　on　which　the　plant　twines　itself。　From　all　this　he　infers　that　wild；　and　in　its　appearance　quite　irregular　beauty；　is　only　pleasing　as　a　change　to　one　whose　eyes　have　become　surfeited　with　regular　beauty。　But　he　need　only　have　made　the　experiment　of　passing　one　day　in　his　pepper　garden　to　realize　that　once　the　regularity　has　enabled　the　understanding　to　put　itself　in　accord　with　the　order　that　is　the　constant　requirement；　instead　of　the　object　diverting　him　any　longer；　it　imposes　an　irksome　constraint　upon　the　imagination：　whereas　nature　subject　to　no　constraint　of　artificial　rules；　and　lavish；　as　it　there　is；　in　its　luxuriant　variety　can　supply　constant　food　for　his　taste。　Even　a　bird's　song；　which　we　can　reduce　to　no　musical　rule；　seems　to　have　more　freedom　in　it；　and　thus　to　be　richer　for　taste；　than　the　human　voice　singing　in　accordance　with　all　the　rules　that　the　art　of　music　prescribes；　for　we　grow　tired　much　sooner　of　frequent　and　lengthy　repetitions　of　the　latter。　Yet　here　most　likely　our　sympathy　with　the　mirth　of　a　dear　little　creature　is　confused　with　the　beauty　of　its　song；　for　if　exactly　imitated　by　man　（as　has　been　sometimes　done　with　the　notes　of　the　nightingale）　it　would　strike　our　ear　as　wholly　destitute　of　taste。　　　Further；　beautiful　objects　have　to　be　distinguished　from　beautiful　views　of　objects　（where　the　distance　often　prevents　a　clear　perception）。　In　the　latter　case；　taste　appears　to　fasten；　not　so　much　on　what　the　imagination　grasps　in　this　field；　as　on　the　incentive　it　receives　to　indulge　in　poetic　fiction；　i。　e。；　in　the　peculiar　fancies　with　which　the　mind　entertains　itself　as　it　is　being　continually　stirred　by　the　variety　that　strikes　the　eye。　It　is　just　as　when　we　watch　the　changing　shapes　of　the　fire　or　of　a　rippling　brook：　neither　of　which　are　things　of　beauty；　but　they　convey　a　charm　to　the　imagination；　because　they　sustain　its　free　play。

SEC1｜BK2　　　　　　　　　　　　FIRST　PART　CRITIQUE　OF　AESTHETIC　JUDGEMENT　　　　　　　　　　　　SECTION　I。　ANALYTIC　OF　AESTHETIC　JUDGEMENT。　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　BOOK　II。　Analytic　of　the　Sublime。

　　　　　SS　23。　Transition　from　the　faculty　of　estimating　the　　　　　　　　　　beautiful　to　that　of　estimating　the　sublime。

　　The　beautiful　and　the　sublime　agree　on　the　point　of　pleasing　on　their　own　account。　Further　they　agree　in　not　presupposing　either　a　judgement　of　sense　or　one　logically　determinant；　but　one　of　reflection。　Hence　it　follows　that　the　delight　does　not　depend　upon　a　sensation；　as　with　the　agreeable；　nor　upon　a　definite　concept；　as　does　the　delight　in　the　good；　although　it　has；　for　all　that；　an　indeterminate　reference　to　concepts。　Consequently　the　delight　is　connected　with　the　mere　presentation　or　faculty　of　presentation；　and　is　thus　taken　to　express　the　accord；　in　a　given　intuition；　of　the　faculty　of　presentation；　or　the　imagination；　with　the　faculty　of　concepts　that　belongs　to　understanding　or　reason；　in　the　sense　of　the　former　assisting　the　latter。　Hence　both　kinds　of　judgements　are　singular；　and　yet　such　as　profess　to　be　universally　valid　in　respect　of　every　subject；　despite　the　fact　that　their　claims　are　directed　merely　to　the　feeling　of　pleasure　and　not　to　any　knowledge　of　the　object。　　　There　are；　however；　also　important　and　striking　differences　between　the　two。　The　beautiful　in　nature　is　a　question　of　the　form　of　object；　and　this　consists　in　limitation；　whereas　the　sublime　is　to　be　found　in　an　object　even　devoid　of　form；　so　far　as　it　immediately　involves；　or　else　by　its　presence　provokes　a　representation　of　limitlessness；　yet　with　a　superadded　thought　of　its　totality。　Accordingly；　the　beautiful　seems　to　be　regarded　as　a　presentation　of　an　indeterminate　concept　of　understanding；　the　sublime　as　a　presentation　of　an　indeterminate　concept　of　reason。　Hence　the　delight　is　in　the　former　case　coupled　with　the　representation　of　quality；　but　in　this　case　with　that　of　quantity。　Moreover；　the　former　delight　is　very　different　from　the