the critique of judgement-第14节

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tive　or　subjective）…consequently　the　bare　form　of　finality　in　the　representation　whereby　an　object　is　given　to　us；　so　far　as　we　are　conscious　of　it　as　that　which　is　alone　capable　of　constituting　the　delight　which；　apart　from　any　concept；　we　estimate　as　universally　communicable；　and　so　of　forming　the　determining　ground　of　the　judgement　of　taste。

　　　　　　　　　SS　12。　The　judgement　of　taste　rests　upon　a　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　priori　grounds。

　　To　determine　a　priori　the　connection　of　the　feeling　of　pleasure　or　displeasure　as　an　effect；　with　some　representation　or　other　（sensation　or　concept）　as　its　cause；　is　utterly　impossible；　for　that　would　be　a　causal　relation　which　（with　objects　of　experience）　is　always　one　that　can　only　be　cognized　a　posteriori　and　with　the　help　of　experience。　True；　in　the　Critique　of　Practical　Reason　we　did　actually　derive　a　priori　from　universal　moral　concepts　the　feeling　of　respect　（as　a　particular　and　peculiar　modification　of　this　feeling　which　does　not　strictly　answer　either　to　the　pleasure　or　displeasure　which　we　receive　from　empirical　objects）。　But　there　we　were　further　able　to　cross　the　border　of　experience　and　call　in　aid　a　causality　resting　on　a　supersensible　attribute　of　the　subject；　namely　that　of　freedom。　But　even　there　it　was　not　this　feeling　exactly　that　we　deduced　from　the　idea　of　the　moral　as　cause；　but　from　this　was　derived　simply　the　determination　of　the　will。　But　the　mental　state　present　in　the　determination　of　the　will　by　any　means　is　at　once　in　itself　a　feeling　of　pleasure　and　identical　with　it；　and　so　does　not　issue　from　it　as　an　effect。　Such　an　effect　must　only　be　assumed　where　the　concept　of　the　moral　as　a　good　precedes　the　determination　of　the　will　by　the　law；　for　in　that　case　it　would　be　futile　to　derive　the　pleasure　combined　with　the　concept　from　this　concept　as　a　mere　cognition。　　　Now　the　pleasure　in　aesthetic　judgements　stands　on　a　similar　footing：　only　that　here　it　is　merely　contemplative　and　does　not　bring　about　an　interest　in　the　object；　whereas　in　the　moral　judgement　it　is　practical；　The　consciousness　of　mere　formal　finality　in　the　play　of　the　cognitive　faculties　of　the　subject　attending　a　representation　whereby　an　object　is　given；　is　the　pleasure　itself；　because　it　involves　a　determining　ground　of　the　subject's　activity　in　respect　of　the　quickening　of　its　cognitive　powers；　and　thus　an　internal　causality　（which　is　final）　in　respect　of　cognition　generally；　but　without　being　limited　to　a　definite　cognition；　and　consequently　a　mere　form　of　the　subjective　finality　of　a　representation　in　an　aesthetic　judgement。　This　pleasure　is　also　in　no　way　practical；　neither　resembling　that　form　the　pathological　ground　of　agreeableness　nor　that　from　the　intellectual　ground　of　the　represented　good。　But　still　it　involves　an　inherent　causality；　that；　namely；　of　preserving　a　continuance　of　the　state　of　the　representation　itself　and　the　active　engagement　of　the　cognitive　powers　without　ulterior　aim。　We　dwell　on　the　contemplation　of　the　beautiful　because　this　contemplation　strengthens　and　reproduces　itself。　The　case　is　analogous　（but　analogous　only）　to　the　way　we　linger　on　a　charm　in　the　representation　of　an　object　which　keeps　arresting　the　attention；　the　mind　all　the　while　remaining　passive。

　　　　　　SS　13。　The　pure　judgement　of　taste　is　independent　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　of　charm　and　emotion。

　　Every　interest　vitiates　the　judgement　of　taste　and　robs　it　of　its　impartiality。　This　is　especially　so　where；　instead　of；　like　the　interest　of　reason；　making　finality　take　the　lead　of　the　lead　of　the　feeling　of　pleasure；　it　grounds　it　upon　this　feeling…which　is　what　always　happens　in　aesthetic　judgements　upon　anything　so　far　as　it　gratifies　or　pains。　Hence　judgements　so　influenced　can　either　lay　no　claim　at　all　to　a　universally　valid　delight；　or　else　must　abate　their　claim　in　proportion　as　sensations　of　the　kind　in　question　enter　into　the　determining　grounds　of　taste。　Taste　that　requires　an　added　element　of　charm　and　emotion　for　its　delight；　not　to　speak　of　adopting　this　as　the　measure　of　its　approval；　has　not　yet　emerged　from　barbarism。　　　And　yet　charms　are　frequently　not　alone　ranked　with　beauty　（which　ought　properly　to　be　a　question　merely　of　the　form）　as　supplementary　to　the　aesthetic　universal　delight；　but　they　have　been　accredited　as　intrinsic　beauties；　and　consequently　the　matter　of　delight　passed　off　for　the　form。　This　is　a　misconception　which；　like　many　others　that　have　still　an　underlying　element　of　truth；　may　be　removed　by　a　careful　definition　of　these　concepts。　　　A　judgement　of　taste　which　is　uninfluenced　by　charm　or　emotion　（though　these　may　be　associated　with　the　delight　in　the　beautiful）；　and　whose　determining　ground；　therefore；　is　simply　finality　of　form；　is　a　pure　judgement　of　taste。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　SS　14　Exemplification。

　　Aesthetic；　just　like　theoretical　（logical）　judgements；　are　divisible　into　empirical　and　pure。　The　first　are　those　by　which　agreeableness　or　disagreeableness；　the　second　those　by　which　beauty　is　predicated　of　an　object　or　its　mode　of　representation。　The　former　are　judgements　of　sense　（material　aesthetic　judgements）；　the　latter　（as　formal）　alone　judgements　of　taste　proper。　　　A　judgement　of　taste；　therefore；　is　only　pure　so　far　as　its　determining　ground　is　tainted　with　no　merely　empirical　delight。　But　such　a　taint　is　always　present　where　charm　or　emotion　have　a　share　in　the　judgement　by　which　something　is　to　be　described　as　beautiful。　　　Here　now　there　is　a　recrudescence　of　a　number　of　specious　pleas　that　go　the　length　of　putting　forward　the　case　that　charm　is　not　merely　a　necessary　ingredient　of　beauty；　but　is　even　of　itself　sufficient　to　merit　the　name　of　beautiful。　A　mere　colour；　such　as　the　green　of　a　plot　of　grass；　or　a　mere　tone　（as　distinguished　from　sound　or　noise）；　like　that　of　a　violin；　is　described　by　most　people　as　in　itself　beautiful；　notwithstanding　the　fact　that　both　seem　to　depend　merely　on　the　matter　of　the　representations　in　other　words；　simply　on　sensation…which　only　entitles　them　to　be　called　agreeable。　But　it　will　at　the　same　time　be　observed　that　sensations　of　colour　as　well　as　of　tone　are　only　entitled　to　be　immediately　regarded　as　beautiful　where；　in　either　case；　they　are　pure。　This　is　a　determination　which　at　once　goes　to　their　form；　and　it　is　the　only　one　which　these　representations　possess　that　admits　with　certainty　of　being　universally　communicated。　For　it　is　not　to　be　assumed　that　even　the　quality　of　the　sensations　agrees　in　all　subjects；　and　we　can　hardly　take　it　for　granted　that　the　agreeableness　of　a　colour；　or　of　the　tone　of　a　musical　instrument；　which　we　judge　to　be　preferable　to　that　of　another；　is　given　a　like　preference　in　the　estimate　of　every　one。　　　Assuming　vibrations　vibration　sound；　and；　what　is　most　important；　that　the　mind　not　alone　perceives　by　sense　their　effect　in　stimulating　the　organs；　but　also；　by　reflection；　the　regular　play　of　the　impressions　（and　consequently　the　form　in　which　different　representations　are　united）…which　I；　still；　in　no　way　doubt…then　colour　and　tone　would　not　be　mere　sensations。　They　would　be　nothing　short　of　formal　determinations　of　the　unity　of　a　manifold　of　sensations；　and　in　that　case　could　even　be　ranked　as　intrinsic　beauties。　　　But　the　purity　of　a　simple　mode　of　sensation　means　that　its　uniformity　is　not　disturbed　or　broken　by　any　foreign　sensation。　It　belongs　merely　to　the　form；　for　abstraction　may　there　be　made　from　the　quality　of　the　mode　of　such　sensation　（what　colour　or　tone；　if　any；　it　represents）。　For　this　reason；　all　simple　colours　are　regarded　as　beautiful　so　far　as　pure。　Composite　colours　have　not　this　advantage；　because；　not　being　simple；　there　is　no　standard　for　estimating　whether　they　should　be　called　pure　or　impure。　　　But　as　for　the　beauty　ascribed　to　the　object　on　account　of　its　form；　and　the　supposition　that　it　is　capable　of　being　enhanced　by　charm；　this　is　a　common　error　and　one　very　prejudicial　to　genuine；　uncorrupted；　sincere　taste。　Nevertheless　charms　may　be　added　to　beauty　to　lend　to　the　mind；　beyond　a　bare　delight；　an　adventitious　interest　in　the　representation　of　the　object；　and　thus　to　advocate　taste　and　its　cultivation。　This　applies　especially　where　taste　is　as　yet　crude　and　untrained。　But　they　are　positively　subversive　of　the　judgement　of　taste；　if　allowed　to　obtrude　themselves　as　grounds　of　estimating　beauty。　For　so　far　are　they　from　contributing　to　beauty　that　it　is　only　where　taste　is　still　weak　and　untrained　that；　like　aliens；　they　are　admitted　as　a　favour；　and　only　on　terms　that　they　do　not　violate　that　beautiful　form。　　　In　painting；　sculpture；　and　in　fact　in　all　the　formative　arts；　in　architecture　and　horticulture；　so　far　as　fine　arts；　the　design　is　what　is　essential。　Here　it　is　not　what　gratifies　in　sensation　but　merely　what　pleases　by　its　form；　that　is　the　fundamental　prerequisite　for　taste。　The　colours　which　give　brilliancy　to　the　sketch　are　part　of　the　charm。　They　may　no　doubt；　in　their　own　way；　enliven　the　object　for　sensation；　but　make　it　really　worth　looking　at　and　beautiful　they　cannot。　Indeed；　more　often　than　not　the　requirements　of　the　beautiful　form　restrict　them　to　a　very　narrow　compass；　and；　even　where　charm　is　admitted；　it　is　only　this　form　that　gives　them　a　p