the critique of judgement-第12节

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！


　must　get　firmly　into　one's　mind　that　by　the　judgement　of　taste　（upon　the　beautiful）　the　delight　in　an　object　is　imputed　to　every　one；　yet　without　being　founded　on　a　concept　（for　then　it　would　be　the　good）；　and　that　this　claim　to　universality　is　such　an　essential　factor　of　a　judgement　by　which　we　describe　anything　as　beautiful；　that　were　it　not　for　its　being　present　to　the　mind　it　would　never　enter　into　any　one's　head　to　use　this　expression；　but　everything　that　pleased　without　a　concept　would　be　ranked　as　agreeable。　For　in　respect　of　the　agreeable；　every　one　is　allowed　to　have　his　own　opinion；　and　no　one　insists　upon　others　agreeing　with　his　judgement　of　taste；　which　is　what　is　invariably　done　in　the　judgement　of　taste　about　beauty。　The　first　of　these　I　may　call　the　taste　of　sense；　the　second；　the　taste　of　reflection：　the　first　laying　down　judgements　merely　private；　the　second；　on　the　other　hand；　judgements　ostensibly　of　general　validity　（public）；　but　both　alike　being　aesthetic　（not　practical）　judgements　about　an　object　merely　in　respect　of　the　bearings　of　its　representation　on　the　feeling　of　pleasure　or　displeasure。　Now　it　does　seem　strange　that　while　with　the　taste　of　sense　it　is　not　alone　experience　that　shows　that　its　judgement　（of　pleasure　or　displeasure　in　something）　is　not　universally　valid；　but　every　one　willingly　refrains　from　imputing　this　agreement　to　others　（despite　the　frequent　actual　prevalence　of　a　considerable　consensus　of　general　opinion　even　in　these　judgements）；　the　taste　of　reflection；　which；　as　experience　teaches；　has　often　enough　to　put　up　with　a　rude　dismissal　of　its　claims　to　universal　validity　of　its　judgement　（upon　the　beautiful）；　can　（as　it　actually　does）　find　it　possible　for　all　that　to　formulate　judgements　capable　of　demanding　this　agreement　in　its　universality。　Such　agreement　it　does　in　fact　require　from　every　one　for　each　of　its　judgements　of　taste　the　persons　who　pass　these　judgements　not　quarreling　over　the　possibility　of　such　a　claim；　but　only　failing　in　particular　cases　to　come　to　terms　as　to　the　correct　application　of　this　faculty。　　　First　of　all　we　have　here　to　note　that　a　universality　which　does　not　rest　upon　concepts　of　the　object　（even　though　these　are　only　empirical）　is　in　no　way　logical；　but　aesthetic；　i。　e。；　does　not　involve　any　objective　quantity　of　the　judgement；　but　only　one　that　is　subjective。　For　this　universality　I　use　the　expression　general　validity；　which　denotes　the　validity　of　the　reference　of　a　representation；　not　to　the　cognitive　faculties；　but　to　the　feeling　of　pleasure　or　displeasure　for　every　subject。　（The　same　expression；　however；　may　also　be　employed　for　the　logical　quantity　of　the　judgement；　provided　we　add　objective　universal　validity；　to　distinguish　it　from　the　merely　subjective　validity　which　is　always　aesthetic。）　　　Now　a　judgement　that　has　objective　universal　validity　has　always　got　the　subjective　also；　i。e。；　if　the　judgement　is　valid　for　everything　which　is　contained　under　a　given　concept；　it　is　valid　also　for　all　who　represent　an　object　by　means　of　this　concept。　But　from　a　subjective　universal　validity；　i。　e。；　the　aesthetic；　that　does　not　rest　on　any　concept；　no　conclusion　can　be　drawn　to　the　logical；　because　judgements　of　that　kind　have　no　bearing　upon　the　object。　But　for　this　very　reason　the　aesthetic　universality　attributed　to　a　judgement　must　also　be　of　a　special　kind；　seeing　that　it　does　not　join　the　predicate　of　beauty　to　the　concept　of　the　object　taken　in　its　entire　logical　sphere；　and　yet　does　extend　this　predicate　over　the　whole　sphere　of　judging　subjects。　　　In　their　logical　quantity；　all　judgements　of　taste　are　singular　judgements。　For；　since　I　must　present　the　object　immediately　to　my　feeling　of　pleasure　or　displeasure；　and　that；　too；　without　the　aid　of　concepts；　such　judgements　cannot　have　the　quantity　of　judgements　with　objective　general　validity。　Yet　by　taking　the　singular　representation　of　the　object　of　the　judgement　of　taste；　and　by　comparison　converting　it　into　a　concept　according　to　the　conditions　determining　that　judgement；　we　can　arrive　at　a　logically　universal　judgement。　For　instance；　by　a　judgement　of　the　taste　I　describe　the　rose　at　which　I　am　looking　as　beautiful。　The　judgement；　on　the　other　hand；　resulting　from　the　comparison　of　a　number　of　singular　representations：　〃Roses　in　general　are　beautiful；〃　is　no　longer　pronounced　as　a　purely　aesthetic　judgement；　but　as　a　logical　judgement　founded　on　one　that　is　aesthetic。　Now　the　judgement；　〃The　rose　is　agreeable〃　（to　smell）　is　also；　no　doubt；　an　aesthetic　and　singular　judgement；　but　then　it　is　not　one　of　taste　but　of　sense。　For　it　has　this　point　of　difference　from　a　judgement　of　taste；　that　the　latter　imports　an　aesthetic　quantity　of　universality；　i。e。；　of　validity　for　everyone　which　is　not　to　be　met　with　in　a　judgement　upon　the　agreeable。　It　is　only　judgements　upon　the　good　which；　while　also　determining　the　delight　in　an　object；　possess　logical　and　not　mere　aesthetic　universality；　for　it　is　as　involving　a　cognition　of　the　object　that　〃they　are　valid　of　it；　and　on　that　account　valid　for　everyone。　　　In　forming　an　estimate　of　objects　merely　from　concepts；　all　representation　of　beauty　goes　by　the　board。　There　can；　therefore；　be　no　rule　according　to　which　any　one　is　to　be　compelled　to　recognize　anything　as　beautiful。　Whether　a　dress；　a　house；　or　a　flower　is　beautiful　is　a　matter　upon　which　one　declines　to　allow　one's　judgement　to　be　swayed　by　any　reasons　or　principles。　We　want　to　get　a　look　at　the　object　with　our　own　eyes；　just　as　if　our　delight　depended　on　sensation。　And　yet；　if　upon　so　doing；　we　call　the　object　beautiful；　we　believe　ourselves　to　be　speaking　with　a　universal　voice；　and　lay　claim　to　the　concurrence　of　everyone；　whereas　no　private　sensation　would　be　decisive　except　for　the　observer　alone　and　his　liking。　　　　Here；　now；　we　may　perceive　that　nothing　is　postulated　in　the　judgement　of　taste　but　such　a　universal　voice　in　respect　of　delight　that　it　is　not　mediated　by　concepts；　consequently；　only　the　possibility　of　an　aesthetic　judgement　capable　of　being　at　the　same　time　deemed　valid　for　everyone。　The　judgement　of　taste　itself　does　not　postulate　the　agreement　of　everyone　（for　it　is　only　competent　for　a　logically　universal　judgement　to　do　this；　in　that　it　is　able　to　bring　forward　reasons）；　it　only　imputes　this　agreement　to　everyone；　as　an　instance　of　the　rule　in　respect　of　which　it　looks　for　confirmation；　not　from　concepts；　but　from　the　concurrence　of　others。　The　universal　voice　is；　therefore；　only　an　idea　…resting　upon　grounds　the　investigation　of　which　is　here　postponed。　It　may　be　a　matter　of　uncertainty　whether　a　person　who　thinks　he　is　laying　down　a　judgement　of　taste　is；　in　fact；　judging　in　conformity　with　that　idea；　but　that　this　idea　is　what　is　contemplated　in　his　judgement；　and　that；　consequently；　it　is　meant　to　be　a　judgement　of　taste；　is　proclaimed　by　his　use　of　the　expression　〃beauty。〃　For　himself　he　can　be　certain　on　the　point　from　his　mere　consciousness　of　the　separation　of　everything　belonging　to　the　agreeable　and　the　good　from　the　delight　remaining　to　him；　and　this　is　all　for　which　be　promises　himself　the　agreement　of　everyone…a　claim　which；　under　these　conditions；　he　would　also　be　warranted　in　making；　were　it　not　that　he　frequently　sinned　against　them；　and　thus　passed　an　erroneous　judgement　of　taste。

　　　　　SS　9。　Investigation　of　the　question　of　the　relative　　　　　　　priority　in　a　judgement　of　taste　of　the　feeling　　　　　　　　of　pleasure　and　the　estimating　of　the　object。

　　The　solution　of　this　problem　is　the　key　to　the　Critique　of　taste；　and　so　is　worthy　of　all　attention。　　　Were　the　pleasure　in　a　given　object　to　be　the　antecedent；　and　were　the　universal　communicability　of　this　pleasure　to　be　all　that　the　judgement　of　taste　is　meant　to　allow　to　the　representation　of　the　object；　such　a　sequence　would　be　self…contradictory。　For　a　pleasure　of　that　kind　would　be　nothing　but　the　feeling　of　mere　agreeableness　to　the　senses；　and　so；　from　its　very　nature；　would　possess　no　more　than　private　validity；　seeing　that　it　would　be　immediately　dependent　on　the　representation　through　which　the　object　is　given。　　　Hence　it　is　the　universal　capacity　for　being　communicated　incident　to　the　mental　state　in　the　given　representation　which；　as　the　subjective　condition　of　the　judgement　of　taste；　must　be；　fundamental；　with　the　pleasure　in　the　object　as　its　consequent。　Nothing；　however；　is　capable　of　being　universally　communicated　but　cognition　and　representation　so　far　as　appurtenant　to　cognition。　For　it　is　only　as　thus　appurtenant　that　the　representation　is　objective；　and　it　is　this　alone　that　gives　it　a　universal　point　of　reference　with　which　the　power　of　representation　of　every　one　is　obliged　to　harmonize。　If；　then；　the　determining　ground　of　the　judgement　as　to　this　universal　communicability　of　the　representation　is　to　be　merely　subjective；　that　is　to　say；　to　be　conceived　independently　of　any　concept　of　the　object；　it　can　be　nothing　else　than　the　mental　state　that　presents　itself　in　the　mutual　relation　of　the　powers　of　representation　so　far　as　they　refer　a　given　representation　to　cognition　in　general。　　　The　cognitive　powers　brought　into　play　by　this　representation　are　here　engaged　in　a　free　play；　since　no　definite　co