the critique of judgement-第11节

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nce　of　an　object；　and　only　decides　how　its　character　stands　with　the　feeling　of　pleasure　and　displeasure。　But　not　even　is　this　contemplation　itself　directed　to　concepts；　for　the　judgement　of　taste　is　not　a　cognitive　judgement　（neither　a　theoretical　one　nor　a　practical）；　and　hence；　also；　is　not　grounded　on　concepts；　nor　yet　intentionally　directed　to　them。　　　The　agreeable；　the　beautiful；　and　the　good　thus　denote　three　different　relations　of　representations　to　the　feeling　of　pleasure　and　displeasure；　as　a　feeling　in　respect　of　which　we　distinguish　different　objects　or　modes　of　representation。　Also；　the　corresponding　expressions　which　indicate　our　satisfaction　in　them　are　different　The　agreeable　is　what　GRATIFIES　a　man；　the　beautiful　what　simply　PLEASES　him；　the　good　what　is　ESTEEMED　（approved）；　i。e。；　that　on　which　he　sets　an　objective　worth。　Agreeableness　is　a　significant　factor　even　with　irrational　animals；　beauty　has　purport　and　significance　only　for　human　beings；　i。e。；　for　beings　at　once　animal　and　rational　（but　not　merely　for　them　as　rational…intelligent　beings…but　only　for　them　as　at　once　animal　and　rational）；　whereas　the　good　is　good　for　every　rational　being　in　general…a　proposition　which　can　only　receive　its　complete　justification　and　explanation　in　the　sequel。　Of　all　these　three　kinds　of　delight；　that　of　taste　in　the　beautiful　may　be　said　to　be　the　one　and　only　disinterested　and　free　delight；　for；　with　it；　no　interest；　whether　of　sense　or　reason；　extorts　approval。　And　so　we　may　say　that　delight；　in　the　three　cases　mentioned；　is　related　to　inclination；　to　favour；　or　to　respect。　For　FAVOUR　is　the　only　free　liking。　An　object　of　inclination；　and　one　which　a　law　of　reason　imposes　upon　our　desire；　leaves　us　no　freedom　to　turn　anything　into　an　object　of　pleasure。　All　interest　presupposes　a　want；　or　calls　one　forth；　and；　being　a　ground　determining　approval；　deprives　the　judgement　on　the　object　of　its　freedom。　　　So　far　as　the　interest　of　inclination　in　the　case　of　the　agreeable　goes；　every　one　says　〃Hunger　is　the　best　sauce；　and　people　with　a　healthy　appetite　relish　everything；　so　long　as　it　is　something　they　can　eat。〃　Such　delight；　consequently；　gives　no　indication　of　taste　having　anything　to　say　to　the　choice。　Only　when　men　have　got　all　they　want　can　we　tell　who　among　the　crowd　has　taste　or　not。　Similarly　there　may　be　correct　habits　（conduct）　without　virtue；　politeness　without　good…will；　propriety　without　honour；　etc。　For　where　the　moral　law　dictates；　there　is；　objectively；　no　room　left　for　free　choice　as　to　what　one　has　to　do；　and　to　show　taste　in　the　way　one　carries　out　these　dictates；　or　in　estimating　the　way　others　do　so；　is　a　totally　different　matter　from　displaying　the　moral　frame　of　one's　mind。　For　the　latter　involves　a　command　and　produces　a　need　of　something；　whereas　moral　taste　only　plays　with　the　objects　of　delight　without　devoting　itself　sincerely　to　any。

　　Definition　of　the　Beautiful　derived　from　the　First　Moment。

　　Taste　is　the　faculty　of　estimating　an　object　or　a　mode　of　representation　by　means　of　a　delight　or　aversion　apart　from　any　interest。　The　object　of　such　a　delight　is　called　beautiful。

　　　　　　　　　　　SECOND　MOMENT。　Of　the　Judgement　of　Taste：　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Moment　of　Quantity。

　　　　　　　　SS　6。　The　beautiful　is　that　which；　apart　from　　　　　　　　　　　　　concepts；　is　represented　as　the　Object　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　of　a　universal　delight。

　　This　definition　of　the　beautiful　is　deducible　from　the　foregoing　definition　of　it　as　an　object　of　delight　apart　from　any　interest。　For　where　any　one　is　conscious　that　his　delight　in　an　object　is　with　him　independent　of　interest；　it　is　inevitable　that　he　should　look　on　the　object　as　one　containing　a　ground　of　delight　for　all　men。　For；　since　the　delight　is　not　based　on　any　inclination　of　the　subject　（or　on　any　other　deliberate　interest）；　but　the　subject　feels　himself　completely　free　in　respect　of　the　liking　which　he　accords　to　the　object；　he　can　find　as　reason　for　his　delight　no　personal　conditions　to　which　his　own　subjective　self　might　alone　be　party。　Hence　he　must　regard　it　as　resting　on　what　he　may　also　presuppose　in　every　other　person；　and　therefore　he　must　believe　that　he　has　reason　for　demanding　a　similar　delight　from　every　one。　Accordingly　he　will　speak　of　the　beautiful　as　if　beauty　were　a　quality　of　the　object　and　the　judgement　logical　（forming　a　cognition　of　the　object　by　concepts　of　it）；　although　it　is　only　aesthetic；　and　contains　merely　a　reference　of　the　representation　of　the　object　to　the　subject；　because　it　still　bears　this　resemblance　to　the　logical　judgement；　that　it　may　be　presupposed　to　be　valid　for　all　men。　But　this　universality　cannot　spring　from　concepts。　For　from　concepts　there　is　no　transition　to　the　feeling　of　pleasure　or　displeasure　（save　in　the　case　of　pure　practical　laws；　which；　however；　carry　an　interest　with　them；　and　such　an　interest　does　not　attach　to　the　pure　judgement　of　taste）。　The　result　is　that　the　judgement　of　taste；　with　its　attendant　consciousness　of　detachment　from　all　interest；　must　involve　a　claim　to　validity　for　all　men；　and　must　do　so　apart　from　universality　attached　to　objects；　i。e。；　there　must　be　coupled　with　it　a　claim　to　subjective　universality。

　　　　　　SS　7。　Comparison　of　the　beautiful　with　the　agreeable　　　　　　　　and　the　good　by　means　of　the　above　characteristic。

　　As　regards　the　agreeable；　every　one　concedes　that　his　judgement；　which　he　bases　on　a　private　feeling；　and　in　which　he　declares　that　an　object　pleases　him；　is　restricted　merely　to　himself　personally。　Thus　he　does　not　take　it　amiss　if；　when　he　says　that　Canary…wine　is　agreeable；　another　corrects　the　expression　and　reminds　him　that　he　ought　to　say：　〃It　is　agreeable　to　me。〃　This　applies　not　only　to　the　taste　of　the　tongue；　the　palate；　and　the　throat；　but　to　what　may　with　any　one　be　agreeable　to　eye　or　ear。　A　violet　colour　is　to　one　soft　and　lovely：　to　another　dull　and　faded。　One　man　likes　the　tone　of　wind　instruments；　another　prefers　that　of　string　instruments。　To　quarrel　over　such　points　with　the　idea　of　condemning　another's　judgement　as　incorrect　when　it　differs　from　our　own；　as　if　the　opposition　between　the　two　judgements　were　logical；　would　be　folly。　With　the　agreeable；　therefore；　the　axiom　holds　good：　Every　one　has　his　own　taste　（that　of　sense）。　　　The　beautiful　stands　on　quite　a　different　footing。　It　would；　on　the　contrary；　be　ridiculous　if　any　one　who　plumed　himself　on　his　taste　were　to　think　of　justifying　himself　by　saying：　〃This　object　（the　building　we　see；　the　dress　that　person　has　on；　the　concert　we　hear；　the　poem　submitted　to　our　criticism）　is　beautiful　for　me。〃　For　if　it　merely　pleases　him；　be　must　not　call　it　beautiful。　Many　things　may　for　him　possess　charm　and　agreeableness…no　one　cares　about　that；　but　when　he　puts　a　thing　on　a　pedestal　and　calls　it　beautiful；　he　demands　the　same　delight　from　others。　He　judges　not　merely　for　himself；　but　for　all　men；　and　then　speaks　of　beauty　as　if　it　were　a　property　of　things。　Thus　he　says　the　thing　is　beautiful；　and　it　is　not　as　if　he　counted　on　others　agreeing　in　his　judgement　of　liking　owing　to　his　having　found　them　in　such　agreement　on　a　number　of　occasions；　but　he　demands　this　agreement　of　them。　He　blames　them　if　they　judge　differently；　and　denies　them　taste；　which　he　still　requires　of　them　as　something　they　ought　to　have；　and　to　this　extent　it　is　not　open　to　men　to　say：　〃Every　one　has　his　own　taste。〃　This　would　be　equivalent　to　saying　that　there　is　no　such　thing　at　all　as　taste；　i。　e。；　no　aesthetic　judgement　capable　of　making　a　rightful　claim　upon　the　assent　of　all　men。　　　Yet　even　in　the　case　of　the　agreeable；　we　find　that　the　estimates　men　form　do　betray　a　prevalent　agreement　among　them；　which　leads　to　our　crediting　some　with　taste　and　denying　it　to　others；　and　that；　too；　not　as　an　organic　sense　but　as　a　critical　faculty　in　respect　of　the　agreeable　generally。　So　of　one　who　knows　how　to　entertain　his　guests　with　pleasures　（of　enjoyment　through　all　the　senses）　in　such　a　way　that　one　and　all　are　pleased；　we　say　that　he　has　taste。　But　the　universality　here　is　only　understood　in　a　comparative　sense；　and　the　rules　that　apply　are；　like　all　empirical　rules；　general　only；　not　universal；　the　latter　being　what　the　judgement　of　taste　upon　the　beautiful　deals　or　claims　to　deal　in。　It　is　a　judgement　in　respect　of　sociability　so　far　as　resting　on　empirical　rules。　In　respect　of　the　good；　it　is　true　that　judgements　also　rightly　assert　a　claim　to　validity　for　every　one；　but　the　good　is　only　represented　as　an　object　of　universal　delight　by　means　of　a　concept；　which　is　the　case　neither　with　the　agreeable　nor　the　beautiful。

　　　　　　　SS　8。　In　a　judgement　of　taste　the　universality　of　　　　　　　　　　　delight　is　only　represented　as　subjective。

　　This　particular　form　of　the　universality　of　an　aesthetic　judgement；　which　is　to　be　met　in　a　judgement　of　taste；　is　a　significant　feature；　not　for　the　logician　certainly；　but　for　the　transcendental　philosopher。　It　calls　for　no　small　effort　on　his　part　to　discover　its　origin；　but　in　return　it　brings　to　light　a　property　of　our　cognitive　faculty　which；　without　this　analysis；　would　have　remained　unknown。　　　First；　one　must　get　firmly　into　one's　mind　that　by　the　judgement　of　taste　（upon　the　beautiful）　the　delight　in