the idea of justice in political economy-第2节

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of　the　community；　of　the　State　and　of　humanity；　in　measuring　and
locating　them　accordingly。　With　relentless　necessity　the
conviction　always　governs　us　that　this　classification　must
determine　the　distribution　of　honors　and　political　influence；　of
position；　of　incomes　and　punishments。　The　similar　should　be
treated　alike；　the　dissimilar　unlike。　It　is　a　reciprocity　of
human　actions　which　we　demand。　The　maintenance　of　reciprocity
appears　just；　its　disregard　unjust。　In　an　unjust　proportion　one
part　obtains　too　much；　the　other　too　little。　The　unjust　usurps
too　much　of　the　good　to　be　distributed；　the　unjustly　suffering
receives　too　little。
　　　　We　call　an　election　system　just　which　distributes　political
influence　according　to　individual　ability　and　merit　in　state　and
community。　We　call　a　penal　code　just　which；　in　spite　of　the
manifold　variety　of　misdemeanors　and　crimes；　in　spite　of　the
seeming　incomparability　of　the　different　punishments；　has　found　a
uniformly　weighing　system　which　parallels　offences　and
punishments　in　accordance　with　public　sentiment。　We　speak　of　a
just　gradation　of　salaries；　of　a　just　promotion　of　officers　in
every　stock　company；　in　every　railroad；　as　well　as　in　the　army；
and　in　the　hierarchy　of　State　officials。　We　speak　of　a　just
distribution　of　taxes；　of　a　just　gradation　of　wages；　of　just
profits；　of　a　just　interest　on　loans。　And　always　there　is　the
same　conception　in　the　background：　men　are　grouped　and　classified
according　to　certain　characteristics；　qualities；　deeds　and
accomplishments；　descent　and　prosperity。　Burdens　and　advantages
should　correspond　to　these　classes。
　　　　The　profit　of　an　undertaking　is　said　to　be　justly　higher　than
the　rate　of　interest；　because　a　greater　risk　and　an　indemnity　for
labor　are　therein　involved；　both　of　which　are　foreign　to
interest。　Interest　on　capital　is　just　because　the　lender　foregoes
a　possible　profit　or　enjoyment；　because　the　borrower　is　in　a　much
worse　position　without　this　aid；　and　because　for　the　service　of
the　one　a　consideration　from　the　other　seems　just。　The　high
earnings　of　the　well…known　physician　or　lawyer　are　just；　such　is
Adam　Smith's　argument；　because　of　the　large　number　who　go　to
great　expense　in　their　studies；　many　have　very　small　incomes；　the
chosen；　able　ones　are　thus　in　a　manner　compensated　therefor。
　　　　Every　house…wife；　every　servant　girl；　daily　and　hourly　thinks
this　price　and　that　unjust；　and　this　always　on　the　ground　of
comparisons；　classifications　and　valuations。　Most　important；
however；　is　the　judgment　of　the　justice　or　injustice　of　the
condition　of　social　classes　in　general。
　　　　Aristotle　calls　slavery　just　when　master　and　slave　are　by
nature　as　different　as　soul　and　body；　as　governing　will　and
external　instrument。　Then；　he　says；　it　is　a　natural；
intrinsically　justified　slavery；　the　external　legal　relation　of
society　corresponds　to　human　nature。　Exactly　the　same　can　be　said
of　all　social　gradations　and　classifications。　We　feel　them　to　be
just　as　far　as　we　find　them　in　accord　with　our　observations　of
similar　or　dissimilar　qualities　of　the　classes　in　question。　The
public　mind　has　never；　apart　from　times　of　error　and　excitement；
begrudged　honor；　riches　and　position　to　those　whose　actions；
whose　abilities　correspondingly　excelled。　It　found　fault　with　the
condition　of　the　middle　and　lower　classes　whenever　it　observed
that　men　of　the　same　race；　the　same　creed；　the　same　community；
were　maltreated　by　their　equals　and　were　held　in　a　subjection　not
corresponding　to　their　education　and　merit。　All　class　struggles
of　the　past　have　arisen　from　these　sentiments。　The　greatest
politicians　and　popular　leaders　of　all　times；　as　well　as　the
greatest　kings　and　Caesars；　placed　themselves　at　the　head　of
movements　which；　originating　in　oppressed；　abused　and　maltreated
classes；　aspired；　successfully　or　otherwise；　to　a　removal　of
unjust　social　conditions。　These　class…struggles　have　often　been
only　for　political　rights；　for　honors；　or　for　marriage　rights。
The　essential　element；　however；　was　always　an　economic　question；
the　distribution　of　incomes　and　wealth　or　the　conditions　and
avenues　to　them；　the　possibilities　of　acquisition；　for　in　the
social　struggle　for　life；　economic　existence　is　the　most
important　factor。
　　　　And　therefore　the　question　always　arises　here　also；　whether
that　which　is；　is　just。　Is　this　restriction　of　trade；　this　or
that　institution　touching　the　distribution　of　wealth；　is　this
entire　distribution　of　incomes　just？
　　　　This　question；　indeed；　is　not　always　equally　emphasized；　the
feelings　which　spring　from　the　answer　do　not　at　all　times　equally
influence　the　masses　and　single　parties。　The　judgment；　that　a
certain　classification　and　distribution　of　incomes　is　just　or
unjust；　is　of　course　not　the　only　one　that　is　given　about　the
social　phenomenon　in　question。　Nor　is　this　judgment；　even　though
thousands　are　agreed　upon　it；　the　only　power　which　rules　the
distribution　of　incomes。　But　this　judgment　is　the　only
psychological　basis　from　which　all　demands　for　the　right　of
equality　have　arisen。　It　is　the　basis　of　all　individualism。　From
the　standpoint　of　mankind　there　may　be　other　demands；　mankind　and
its　interests　demand　sacrifices　in　the　upper　as　well　as　in　the
lower　ranks。　The　practical　representatives　of　this　standpoint　in
political　life　must；　therefore；　necessarily　seek　to　combat　or　to
weaken　the　conclusions　resulting　from　this　fundamental　principle
of　individualism。　And　from　their　standpoint　they　are　justified　in
so　doing。　But　equally　justified　on　the　other　hand　is　the
standpoint　of　individualism；　and　it　is　this　which　demands
justice；　proportionality　of　duties　and　rights；　it　demands
equality　for　equal；　inequality　for　unequal　men。　The　principle　of
civil；　political　and　social　equality　will　never　have　a　firm
foundation　unless　one　seeks　it　in　this　connection。　Every
limitation　of　the　principle　of　equality；　other　than　that　which　is
prompted　by　the　qualities　and　merits　of　men；　is　arbitrary。
Material　justice　demands　equal　rights　only　in　so　far　as　it
observes　equal　qualities；　as　it　presumes　the　possibility　of　equal
achievement　and　fulfillment　of　duties。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　II

　　　　Thus　the　approving　or　disapproving　judgment　of　the　justice　of
human　actions　or　institutions　always　rests　on　the　same
psychological　processes。　But　the　results　to　which　it　comes　may　be
very　different。　How　would　it　otherwise　be　possible　that　the
conceptions　of　justice　of　barbarians；　of　heathens；　of　Christians；
of　men　of　modern　culture；　differ　so　much　that　something　different
is　always　demanded　under　the　plea　of　justice？　Even　within　the
same　nation　and　the　same　period　the　controversy　as　to　what
constitutes　justice　will　never　cease；　but　from　time　to　time
certain　judgments　will　succeed　in　placing　themselves　in　the
dominating　centre　of　the　progressive　movement；　certain　results　of
former　intellectual　contests　will　descend　to　posterity　as　a
secured　inheritance；　and　as　long　as　the　night　of　barbarism　does
not　break　in　again　they　will　rule　and　influence　it　more　and　more。
　　　　If　we　now　try　to　explain　somewhat　more　fully　the
psychological　processes　in　question；　the　first　step　always　seems
to　be　to　group　in　our　conceptions　a　number　of　men　into　bodies　of
moral　community。　These　bodies　are　then　compared　and　tested
according　to　their　qualities　and　actions。　The　equalities　are
searched　for　and　found　by　the　judgment；　the　inequalities　and
their　degrees　are　tried　by　the　estimating　and　valuing　sense。　It
is　in　the　realm　of　the　feelings　in　which　all　the　final　decisions
on　this　most　important　point　are　reached。　All　feelings　finally
resolve　themselves　into　an　adjudging　or　disparaging；　into　an
estimation　and　a　sensation　of　that　which　furthers　and　that　which
impedes　us；　they　are　decisions　on　the　worth　of　men　and　things。
And　upon　this　now　follows　finally　the　simple　logical　conclusion：
the　persons　whom　I　am　to　conceive　as　a　moral　community　must；　as
far　as　human　intervention　reaches；　be　treated　equally　in　the
measure　of　their　equality；　unequally　in　the　measure　of　their
inequality。
　　　　The　groups　of　persons　into　which　our　conceptions　necessarily
classify　mankind　are　manifold。　The　members　of　the　family　and　the
tribe；　the　bellows　of　a　society　and　a　community；　the　citizens　of
a　State　and　of　a　federation；　the　members　of　a　church　and　of　a
race；　finally　all　humanity　in　a　certain　sense　can　be　so　grouped；
but　only　in　so　far　as　they　form　a　moral　community　and　pursue
certain　common　ends。　Whosoever　stands　without　the　group　is
foreign　to　the　comparison；　is　not　comprised　in　the　judgment　of
what　is　just。　Hence　a　barbarian　does　not　think　it　unjust　to　kill
the　stranger；　only　the　conception　of　a　moral　community　between
all　nations　and　all　men　prevents　this。　Likewise　it　does　not　seem
to　me　unjust　that　an　Englishman　pays　double　the　taxes　paid　by　a
German　of　equal　income。　With　the　variety　of　different　human
purposes　and　communities　the　same　man　appears　at　one　time　like
his　fellows；　at　another　unlike。　In　a　club　of　any　kind　which
claims　but　a　small　fraction　of　our　interest；　we　see　no　injustice
in　a　per　capita　assessment　which　we　would　consider　unbearable　in
a　State　or　community。　It　accords　with　our　idea　of　justic