an enquiry concerning human understanding-第4节

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thinking　are　derived　either　from　our　outward　or　inward
sentiment：　The　mixture　and　composition　of　these　belongs
alone　to　the　mind　and　will。　Or；　to　express　myself　in
philosophical　language；　all　our　ideas　or　more　feeble
perceptions　are　copies　of　our　impressions　or　more　lively
ones。

　　　　　To　prove　this；　the　two　following　arguments　will；　I
hope；　be　sufficient。　First；　when　we　analyze　our　thoughts　or
ideas；　however　compounded　or　sublime；　we　always　find　that
they　resolve　themselves　into　such　simple　ideas　as　were
copied　from　a　precedent　feeling　or　sentiment。　Even　those
ideas；　which；　at　first　view；　seem　the　most　wide　of　this
origin；　are　found；　upon　a　nearer　scrutiny；　to　be　derived
from　it。　The　idea　of　God；　as　meaning　an　infinitely
intelligent；　wise；　and　good　Being；　arises　from　reflecting　on
the　operations　of　our　own　mind；　and　augmenting；　without
limit；　those　qualities　of　goodness　and　wisdom。　We　may
prosecute　this　enquiry　to　what　length　we　please；　where　we
shall　always　find；　that　every　idea　which　we　examine　is
copied　from　a　similar　impression。　Those　who　would　assert
that　this　position　is　not　universally　true　nor　without
exception；　have　only　one；　and　that　an　easy　method　of
refuting　it；　by　producing　that　idea；　which；　in　their
opinion；　is　not　derived　from　this　source。　It　will　then　be
incumbent　on　us；　if　we　would　maintain　our　doctrine；　to
produce　the　impression；　or　lively　perception；　which
corresponds　to　it。

　　　　　Secondly。　If　it　happen；　from　a　defect　of　the　organ；
that　a　man　is　not　susceptible　of　any　species　of　sensation；
we　always　find　that　he　is　as　little　susceptible　of　the
correspondent　ideas。　A　blind　man　can　form　no　notion　of
colours；　a　deaf　man　of　sounds。　Restore　either　of　them　that
sense　in　which　he　is　deficient；　by　opening　this　new　inlet
for　his　sensations；　you　also　open　an　inlet　for　the　ideas；
and　he　finds　no　difficulty　in　conceiving　these　objects。　The
case　is　the　same；　if　the　object；　proper　for　exciting　any
sensation；　has　never　been　applied　to　the　organ。　A
L/APLANDER　or　N/EGROE　has　no　notion　of　the　relish　of　wine。
And　though　there　are　few　or　no　instances　of　a　like
deficiency　in　the　mind；　where　a　person　has　never　felt　or　is
wholly　incapable　of　a　sentiment　or　passion　that　belongs　to
his　species；　yet　we　find　the　same　observation　to　take　place
in　a　less　degree。　A　man　of　mild　manners　can　form　no　idea　of
inveterate　revenge　or　cruelty；　nor　can　a　selfish　heart
easily　conceive　the　heights　of　friendship　and　generosity。　It
is　readily　allowed；　that　other　beings　may　possess　many
senses　of　which　we　can　have　no　conception；　because　the　ideas
of　them　have　never　been　introduced　to　us　in　the　only　manner
by　which　an　idea　can　have　access　to　the　mind；　to　wit；　by　the
actual　feeling　and　sensation。

　　　　　There　is；　however；　one　contradictory　phenomenon；　which
may　prove　that　it　is　not　absolutely　impossible　for　ideas　to
arise；　independent　of　their　correspondent　impressions。　I
believe　it　will　readily　be　allowed；　that　the　several
distinct　ideas　of　colour；　which　enter　by　the　eye；　or　those
of　sound；　which　are　conveyed　by　the　ear；　are　really
different　from　each　other；　though；　at　the　same　time；
resembling。　Now　if　this　be　true　of　different　colours；　it
must　be　no　less　so　of　the　different　shades　of　the　same
colour；　and　each　shade　produces　a　distinct　idea；　independent
of　the　rest。　For　if　this　should　be　denied；　it　is　possible；
by　the　continual　gradation　of　shades；　to　run　a　colour
insensibly　into　what　is　most　remote　from　it；　and　if　you　will
not　allow　any　of　the　means　to　be　different；　you　cannot；
without　absurdity；　deny　the　extremes　to　be　the　same。
Suppose；　therefore；　a　person　to　have　enjoyed　his　sight　for
thirty　years；　and　to　have　become　perfectly　acquainted　with
colours　of　all　kinds　except　one　particular　shade　of　blue；
for　instance；　which　it　never　has　been　his　fortune　to　meet
with。　Let　all　the　different　shades　of　that　colour；　except
that　single　one；　be　placed　before　him；　descending　gradually
from　the　deepest　to　the　lightest；　it　is　plain　that　he　will
perceive　a　blank；　where　that　shade　is　wanting；　and　will　be
sensible　that　there　is　a　greater　distance　in　that　place
between　the　contiguous　colour　than　in　any　other。　Now　I　ask；
whether　it　be　possible　for　him；　from　his　own　imagination；　to
supply　this　deficiency；　and　raise　up　to　himself　the　idea　of
that　particular　shade；　though　it　had　never　been　conveyed　to
him　by　his　senses？　I　believe　there　are　few　but　will　be　of
opinion　that　he　can：　And　this　may　serve　as　a　proof　that　the
simple　ideas　are　not　always；　in　every　instance；　derived　from
the　correspondent　impressions；　though　this　instance　is　so
singular；　that　it　is　scarcely　worth　our　observing；　and　does
not　merit　that　for　it　alone　we　should　alter　our　general
maxim。

　　　　　Here；　therefore；　is　a　proposition；　which　not　only
seems；　in　itself；　simple　and　intelligible；　but；　if　a　proper
use　were　made　of　it；　might　render　every　dispute　equally
intelligible；　and　banish　all　that　jargon；　which　has　so　long
taken　possession　of　metaphysical　reasonings；　and　drawn
disgrace　upon　them。　All　ideas；　especially　abstract　ones；　are
naturally　faint　and　obscure：　The　mind　has　but　a　slender　hold
of　them：　They　are　apt　to　be　confounded　with　other　resembling
ideas；　and　when　we　have　often　employed　any　term；　though
without　a　distinct　meaning；　we　are　apt　to　imagine　it　has　a
determinate　idea　annexed　to　it。　On　the　contrary；　all
impressions；　that　is；　all　sensations；　either　outward　or
inward；　are　strong　and　vivid：　The　limits　between　them　are
more　exactly　determined：　Nor　is　it　easy　to　fall　into　any
error　or　mistake　with　regard　to　them。　When　we　entertain；
therefore；　any　suspicion　that　a　philosophical　term　is
employed　without　any　meaning　or　idea　（as　is　but　too
frequent）；　we　need　but　enquire；　？　And　if　it　be　impossible　to
assign　any；　this　will　serve　to　confirm　our　suspicion。　By
bringing　ideas　into　so　clear　a　light　we　may　reasonably　hope
to　remove　all　dispute；　which　may　arise；　concerning　their
nature　and　reality。＇4＇

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　*　*　*　*
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　SECTION　III。
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Of　the　Association　of　Ideas。
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　
　　　　　I/T　is　evident　that　there　is　a　principle　of　connexion
between　the　different　thoughts　or　ideas　of　the　mind；　and
that　in　their　appearance　to　the　memory　or　imagination；　they
introduce　each　other　with　a　certain　degree　of　method　and
regularity。　In　our　more　serious　thinking　or　discourse　this
is　so　observable　that　any　particular　thought；　which　breaks
in　upon　the　regular　tract　or　chain　of　ideas；　is　immediately
remarked　and　rejected。　And　even　in　our　wildest　and　most
wandering　reveries；　nay　in　our　very　dreams；　we　shall　find；
if　we　reflect；　that　the　imagination　ran　not　altogether　at
adventures；　but　that　there　was　still　a　connexion　upheld
among　the　different　ideas；　which　succeeded　each　other。　Were
the　loosest　and　freest　conversation　to　be　transcribed；　there
would　immediately　be　observed　something　which　connected　it
in　all　its　transitions。　Or　where　this　is　wanting；　the　person
who　broke　the　thread　of　discourse　might　still　inform　you；
that　there　had　secretly　revolved　in　his　mind　a　succession　of
thought；　which　had　gradually　led　him　from　the　subject　of
conversation。　Among　different　languages；　even　where　we
cannot　suspect　the　least　connexion　or　communication；　it　is
found；　that　the　words；　expressive　of　ideas；　the　most
compounded；　do　yet　nearly　correspond　to　each　other：　A
certain　proof　that　the　simple　ideas；　comprehended　in　the
compound　ones；　were　bound　together　by　some　universal
principle；　which　had　an　equal　influence　on　all　mankind。

　　　　　Though　it　be　too　obvious　to　escape　observation；　that
different　ideas　are　connected　together；　I　do　not　find　that
any　philosopher　has　attempted　to　enumerate　or　class　all　the
principles　of　association；　a　subject；　however；　that　seems
worthy　of　curiosity。　To　me；　there　appear　to　be　only　three
principles　of　connexion　among　ideas；　namely；　；
　in　time　or　place；　and　　or　。

　　　　　That　these　principles　serve　to　connect　ideas　will　not；
I　believe；　be　much　doubted。　A　picture　naturally　leads　our
thoughts　to　the　original：＇5＇　the　mention　of　one　apartment　in
a　building　naturally　introduces　an　enquiry　or　discourse
concerning　the　others：＇6＇　and　if　we　think　of　a　wound；　we　can
scarcely　forbear　reflecting　on　the　pain　which　follows　it。＇7＇
But　that　this　enumeration　is　complete；　and　that　there　are　no
other　principles　of　association　except　these；　may　be
difficult　to　prove　to　the　satisfaction　of　the　reader；　or
even　to　a　man's　own　satisfaction。　All　we　can　do；　in　such
cases；　is　to　run　over　several　instances；　and　examine
carefully　the　principle　which　binds　the　different　thoughts
to　each　other；　never　stopping　till　we　render　the　principle
as　general　as　possible。＇8＇　The　more　instances　we　examine；
and　the　more　care　we　employ；　the　more　assurance　shall　we
acquire；　that　the　enumeration；　which　we　form　from　the　whole；
is　complete　and　entire。＇9＇

　　　　　Instead　of　entering　into　a　detail　of　this　kind；　which
would　lead　us　into　many　useless　subtilties；　we　shall
consider　some　of　the　effects　of　this　connection　upon　the