an enquiry concerning human understanding-第32节

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exist；　independent　of　our　perception；　and　to　be　something
external　to　our　mind；　which　perceives　it。　Our　presence
bestows　not　being　on　it：　Our　absence　does　not　annihilate　it。
It　preserves　its　existence　uniform　and　entire；　independent
of　the　situation　of　intelligent　beings；　who　perceive　or
contemplate　it。

　　　　　But　this　universal　and　primary　opinion　of　all　men　is
soon　destroyed　by　the　slightest　philosophy；　which　teaches
us；　that　nothing　can　ever　be　present　to　the　mind　but　an
image　or　perception；　and　that　the　senses　are　only　the
inlets；　through　which　these　images　are　conveyed；　without
being　able　to　produce　any　immediate　intercourse　between　the
mind　and　the　object。　The　table；　which　we　see；　seems　to
diminish；　as　we　remove　farther　from　it：　But　the　real　table；
which　exists　independent　of　us；　suffers　no　alteration：　It
was；　therefore；　nothing　but　its　image；　which　was　present　to
the　mind。　These　are　the　obvious　dictates　of　reason；　and　no
man；　who　reflects；　ever　doubted；　that　the　existences；　which
we　consider；　when　we　say；　　and　；　are
nothing　but　perceptions　in　the　mind；　and　fleeting　copies　or
representations　of　other　existences；　which　remain　uniform
and　independent。

　　　　　So　far；　then；　are　we　necessitated　by　reasoning　to
contradict　or　depart　from　the　primary　instincts　of　nature；
and　to　embrace　a　new　system　with　regard　to　the　evidence　of
our　senses。　But　here　philosophy　finds　herself　extremely
embarrassed；　when　she　would　justify　this　new　system；　and
obviate　the　cavils　and　objections　of　the　sceptics。　She　can
no　longer　plead　the　infallible　and　irresistible　instinct　of
nature：　For　that　led　us　to　a　quite　different　system；　which
is　acknowledged　fallible　and　even　erroneous。　And　to　justify
this　pretended　philosophical　system；　by　a　chain　of　clear　and
convincing　argument；　or　even　any　appearance　of　argument；
exceeds　the　power　of　all　human　capacity。

　　　　　By　what　argument　can　it　be　proved；　that　the　perceptions
of　the　mind　must　be　caused　by　external　objects；　entirely
different　from　them；　though　resembling　them　（if　that　be
possible）　and　could　not　arise　either　from　the　energy　of　the
mind　itself；　or　from　the　suggestion　of　some　invisible　and
unknown　spirit；　or　from　some　other　cause　still　more　unknown
to　us？　It　is　acknowledged；　that；　in　fact；　many　of　these
perceptions　arise　not　from　any　thing　external；　as　in　dreams；
madness；　and　other　diseases。　And　nothing　can　be　more
inexplicable　than　the　manner；　in　which　body　should　so
operate　upon　mind　as　ever　to　convey　an　image　of　itself　to　a
substance；　supposed　of　so　different；　and　even　contrary　a
nature。

　　　　　It　is　a　question　of　fact；　whether　the　perceptions　of
the　senses　be　produced　by　external　objects；　resembling　them：
how　shall　this　question　be　determined？　By　experience　surely；
as　all　other　questions　of　a　like　nature。　But　here　experience
is；　and　must　be　entirely　silent。　The　mind　has　never　any
thing　present　to　it　but　the　perceptions；　and　cannot　possibly
reach　any　experience　of　their　connexion　with　objects。　The
supposition　of　such　a　connexion　is；　therefore；　without　any
foundation　in　reasoning。

　　　　　To　have　recourse　to　the　veracity　of　the　supreme　Being；
in　order　to　prove　the　veracity　of　our　senses；　is　surely
making　a　very　unexpected　circuit。　If　his　veracity　were　at
all　concerned　in　this　matter；　our　senses　would　be　entirely
infallible；　because　it　is　not　possible　that　he　can　ever
deceive。　Not　to　mention；　that；　if　the　external　world　be　once
called　in　question；　we　shall　be　at　a　loss　to　find　arguments；
by　which　we　may　prove　the　existence　of　that　Being　or　any　of
his　attributes。

　　　　　This　is　a　topic；　therefore；　in　which　the　profounder　and
more　philosophical　sceptics　will　always　triumph；　when　they
endeavour　to　introduce　an　universal　doubt　into　all　subjects
of　human　knowledge　and　enquiry。　Do　you　follow　the　instincts
and　propensities　of　nature；　may　they　say；　in　assenting　to
the　veracity　of　sense？　But　these　lead　you　to　believe　that
the　very　perception　or　sensible　image　is　the　external
object。　Do　you　disclaim　this　principle；　in　order　to　embrace
a　more　rational　opinion；　that　the　perceptions　are　only
representations　of　something　external？　You　here　depart　from
your　natural　propensities　and　more　obvious　sentiments；　and
yet　are　not　able　to　satisfy　your　reason；　which　can　never
find　any　convincing　argument　from　experience　to　prove；　that
the　perceptions　are　connected　with　any　external　objects。

　　　　　There　is　another　sceptical　topic　of　a　like　nature；
derived　from　the　most　profound　philosophy；　which　might　merit
our　attention；　were　it　requisite　to　dive　so　deep；　in　order
to　discover　arguments　and　reasonings；　which　can　so　little
serve　to　any　serious　purpose。　It　is　universally　allowed　by
modern　enquirers；　that　all　the　sensible　qualities　of
objects；　such　as　hard；　soft；　hot；　cold；　white；　black；　&c。
are　merely　secondary；　and　exist　not　in　the　objects
themselves；　but　are　perceptions　of　the　mind；　without　any
external　archetype　or　model；　which　they　represent。　If　this
be　allowed；　with　regard　to　secondary　qualities；　it　must　also
follow；　with　regard　to　the　supposed　primary　qualities　of
extension　and　solidity；　nor　can　the　latter　be　any　more
entitled　to　that　denomination　than　the　former。　The　idea　of
extension　is　entirely　acquired　from　the　senses　of　sight　and
feeling；　and　if　all　the　qualities；　perceived　by　the　senses；
be　in　the　mind；　not　in　the　object；　the　same　conclusion　must
reach　the　idea　of　extension；　which　is　wholly　dependent　on
the　sensible　ideas　or　the　ideas　of　secondary　qualities。
Nothing　can　save　us　from　this　conclusion；　but　the　asserting；
that　the　ideas　of　those　primary　qualities　are　attained　by
；　an　opinion；　which；　if　we　examine　it
accurately；　we　shall　find　to　be　unintelligible；　and　even
absurd。　An　extension；　that　is　neither　tangible　nor　visible；
cannot　possibly　be　conceived：　And　a　tangible　or　visible
extension；　which　is　neither　hard　nor　soft；　black　nor　white；
is　equally　beyond　the　reach　of　human　conception。　Let　any　man
try　to　conceive　a　triangle　in　general；　which　is　neither
　nor　；　nor　has　any　particular　length　or
proportion　of　sides；　and　he　will　soon　perceive　the　absurdity
of　all　the　scholastic　notions　with　regard　to　abstraction　and
general　ideas。＇37＇

　　　　　Thus　the　first　philosophical　objection　to　the　evidence
of　sense　or　to　the　opinion　of　external　existence　consists　in
this；　that　such　an　opinion；　if　rested　on　natural　instinct；
is　contrary　to　reason；　and　if　referred　to　reason；　is
contrary　to　natural　instinct；　and　at　the　same　time　carries
no　rational　evidence　with　it；　to　convince　an　impartial
enquirer。　The　second　objection　goes　farther；　and　represents
this　opinion　as　contrary　to　reason：　At　least；　if　it　be　a
principle　of　reason；　that　all　sensible　qualities　are　in　the
mind；　not　in　the　object。　Bereave　matter　of　all　its
intelligible　qualities；　both　primary　and　secondary；　you　in　a
manner　annihilate　it；　and　leave　only　a　certain　unknown；
inexplicable　；　as　the　cause　of　our　perceptions；　a
notion　so　imperfect；　that　no　sceptic　will　think　it　worth
while　to　contend　against　it。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　*　*　*　*
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　PART　II。
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　
　　　　　I/T　may　seem　a　very　extravagant　attempt　of　the
sceptics　to　destroy　　by　argument　and　ratiocination；
yet　is　this　the　grand　scope　of　all　their　enquiries　and
disputes。　They　endeavour　to　find　objections；　both　to　our
　reasonings；　and　to　those　which　regard　matter　of
fact　and　existence。

　　　　　The　chief　objection　against　all　abstract　reasonings　is
derived　from　the　ideas　of　space　and　time；　ideas；　which；　in
common　life　and　to　a　careless　view；　are　very　clear　and
intelligible；　but　when　they　pass　through　the　scrutiny　of　the
profound　sciences　（and　they　are　the　chief　object　of　these
sciences）　afford　principles；　which　seem　full　of　absurdity
and　contradiction。　No　priestly　；　invented　on　purpose
to　tame　and　subdue　the　rebellious　reason　of　mankind；　ever
shocked　common　sense　more　than　the　doctrine　of　the
infinitive　divisibility　of　extension；　with　its　consequences；
as　they　are　pompously　displayed　by　all　geometricians　and
metaphysicians；　with　a　kind　of　triumph　and　exultation。　A
real　quantity；　infinitely　less　than　any　finite　quantity；
containing　quantities　infinitely　less　than　itself；　and　so　on
；　this　is　an　edifice　so　bold　and　prodigious；
that　it　is　too　weighty　for　any　pretended　demonstration　to
support；　because　it　shocks　the　clearest　and　most　natural
principles　of　human　reason。＇38＇　But　what　renders　the　matter
more　extraordinary；　is；　that　these　seemingly　absurd　opinions
are　supported　by　a　chain　of　reasoning；　the　clearest　and　most
natural；　nor　is　it　possible　for　us　to　allow　the　premises
without　admitting　the　consequences。　Nothing　can　be　more
convincing　and　satisfactory　than　all　the　conclusions
concerning　the　properties　of　circles　and　triangles；　and　yet；
when　these　are　once　received；　how　can　we　deny；　that　the
angle　of　contact　between　a　circle　and　its　tangent　is
infinitely　less　than　any　rectilineal　angle；　that　as　you　may
increase　the　diameter　of　the　circle　；　this
angle　of　contact　becomes　still　le