an enquiry concerning human understanding-第30节

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reason　to　ascribe　justice；　in　our　sense　of　it；　to　the　gods。
If　you　hold　a　medium　between　affirmation　and　negation；　by
saying；　that　the　justice　of　the　gods；　at　present；　exerts
itself　in　part；　but　not　in　its　full　extent；　I　answer；　that
you　have　no　reason　to　give　it　any　particular　extent；　but
only　so　far　as　you　see　it；　；　exert　itself。

　　　　　Thus　I　bring　the　dispute；　O　A/THENIANS；　to　a　short
issue　with　my　antagonists。　The　course　of　nature　lies　open　to
my　contemplation　as　well　as　to　theirs。　The　experienced　train
of　events　is　the　great　standard；　by　which　we　all　regulate
our　conduct。　Nothing　else　can　be　appealed　to　in　the　field；
or　in　the　senate。　Nothing　else　ought　ever　to　be　heard　of　in
the　school；　or　in　the　closet。　In　vain　would　our　limited
understanding　break　through　those　boundaries；　which　are　too
narrow　for　our　fond　imagination。　While　we　argue　from　the
course　of　nature；　and　infer　a　particular　intelligent　cause；
which　first　bestowed；　and　still　preserves　order　in　the
universe；　we　embrace　a　principle；　which　is　both　uncertain
and　useless。　It　is　uncertain；　because　the　subject　lies

entirely　beyond　the　reach　of　human　experience。　It　is
useless；　because　our　knowledge　of　this　cause　being　derived
entirely　from　the　course　of　nature；　we　can　never；　according
to　the　rules　of　just　reasoning；　return　back　from　the　cause
with　any　new　inference；　or　making　additions　to　the　common
and　experienced　course　of　nature；　establish　any　new
principles　of　conduct　and　behaviour。

　　　　　I　observe　（said　I；　finding　he　had　finished　his
harangue）　that　you　neglect　not　the　artifice　of　the
demagogues　of　old；　and　as　you　were　pleased　to　make　me　stand
for　the　people；　you　insinuate　yourself　into　my　favour　by
embracing　those　principles；　to　which；　you　know；　I　have
always　expressed　a　particular　attachment。　But　allowing　you
to　make　experience　（as　indeed　I　think　you　ought）　the　only
standard　of　our　judgement　concerning　this；　and　all　other
questions　of　fact；　I　doubt　not　but；　from　the　very　same
experience；　to　which　you　appeal；　it　may　be　possible　to
refute　this　reasoning；　which　you　have　put　into　the　mouth　of
E/PICURUS。　If　you　saw；　for　instance；　a　half…　finished
building；　surrounded　with　heaps　of　brick　and　stone　and
mortar；　and　all　the　instruments　of　masonry；　could　you　not
　from　the　effect；　that　it　was　a　work　of　design　and
contrivance？　And　could　you　not　return　again；　from　this
inferred　cause；　to　infer　new　additions　to　the　effect；　and
conclude；　that　the　building　would　soon　be　finished；　and
receive　all　the　further　improvements；　which　art　could　bestow
upon　it？　If　you　saw　upon　the　sea…shore　the　print　of　one
human　foot；　you　would　conclude；　that　a　man　had　passed　that
way；　and　that　he　had　also　left　the　traces　of　the　other　foot；
though　effaced　by　the　rolling　of　the　sands　or　inundation　of
the　waters。　Why　then　do　you　refuse　to　admit　the　same　method
of　reasoning　with　regard　to　the　order　of　nature？　Consider
the　world　and　the　present　life　only　as　an　imperfect
building；　from　which　you　can　infer　a　superior　intelligence；
and　arguing　from　that　superior　intelligence；　which　can　leave
nothing　imperfect；　why　may　you　not　infer　a　more　finished
scheme　or　plan；　which　will　receive　its　completion　in　some
distant　point　of　space　or　time？　Are　not　these　methods　of
reasoning　exactly　similar？　And　under　what　pretence　can　you
embrace　the　one；　while　you　reject　the　other？

　　　　　The　infinite　difference　of　the　subjects；　replied　he；　is
a　sufficient　foundation　for　this　difference　in　my
conclusions。　In　works　of　　art　and　contrivance；　it　is
allowable　to　advance　from　the　effect　to　the　cause；　and
returning　back　from　the　cause；　to　form　new　inferences
concerning　the　effect；　and　examine　the　alterations；　which　it
has　probably　undergone；　or　may　still　undergo。　But　what　is
the　foundation　of　this　method　of　reasoning？　Plainly　this；
that　man　is　a　being；　whom　we　know　by　experience；　whose
motives　and　designs　we　are　acquainted　with；　and　whose
projects　and　inclinations　have　a　certain　connexion　and
coherence；　according　to　the　laws　which　nature　has
established　for　the　government　of　such　a　creature。　When；
therefore；　we　find；　that　any　work　has　proceeded　from　the
skill　and　industry　of　man；　as　we　are　otherwise　acquainted
with　the　nature　of　the　animal；　we　can　draw　a　hundred
inferences　concerning　what　may　be　expected　from　him；　and
these　inferences　will　all　be　founded　in　experience　and
observation。　But　did　we　know　man　only　from　the　single　work
or　production　which　we　examine；　it　were　impossible　for　us　to
argue　in　this　manner；　because　our　knowledge　of　all　the
qualities；　which　we　ascribe　to　him；　being　in　that　case
derived　from　the　production；　it　is　impossible　they　could
point　to　any　thing　farther；　or　be　the　foundation　of　any　new
inference。　The　print　of　a　foot　in　the　sand　can　only　prove；
when　considered　alone；　that　there　was　some　figure　adapted　to
it；　by　which　it　was　produced：　But　the　print　of　a　human　foot
proves　likewise；　from　our　other　experience；　that　there　was
probably　another　foot；　which　also　left　its　impression；
though　effaced　by　time　or　other　accidents。　Here　we　mount
from　the　effect　to　the　cause；　and　descending　again　from　the
cause；　infer　alterations　in　the　effect；　but　this　is　not　a
continuation　of　the　same　simple　chain　of　reasoning。　We
comprehend　in　this　case　a　hundred　other　experiences　and
observations；　concerning　the　　figure　and　members　of
that　species　of　animal；　without　which　this　method　of
argument　must　be　considered　as　fallacious　and　sophistical。

　　　　　The　case　is　not　the　same　with　our　reasonings　from　the
works　of　nature。　The　Deity　is　known　to　us　only　by　his
productions；　and　is　a　single　being　in　the　universe；　not
comprehended　under　any　species　or　genus；　from　whose
experienced　attributes　or　qualities；　we　can；　by　analogy；
infer　any　attribute　or　quality　in　him。　As　the　universe　shews
wisdom　and　goodness；　we　infer　wisdom　and　goodness。　As　it
shews　a　particular　degree　of　these　perfections；　we　infer　a
particular　degree　of　them；　precisely　adapted　to　the　effect
which　we　examine。　But　farther　attributes　or　farther　degrees
of　the　same　attributes；　we　can　never　be　authorised　to　infer
or　suppose；　by　any　rules　of　just　reasoning。　Now；　without
some　such　licence　of　supposition；　it　is　impossible　for　us　to
argue　from　the　cause；　or　infer　any　alteration　in　the　effect；
beyond　what　has　immediately　fallen　under　our　observation。
Greater　good　produced　by　this　Being　must　still　prove　a
greater　degree　of　goodness：　A　more　impartial　distribution　of
rewards　and　punishments　must　proceed　from　a　greater　regard
to　justice　and　equity。　Every　supposed　addition　to　the　works
of　nature　makes　an　addition　to　the　attributes　of　the　Author
of　nature；　and　consequently；　being　entirely　unsupported　by
any　reason　or　argument；　can　never　be　admitted　but　as　mere
conjecture　and　hypothesis。＇36＇

　　　　　The　great　source　of　our　mistake　in　this　subject；　and　of
the　unbounded　licence　of　conjecture；　which　we　indulge；　is；
that　we　tacitly　consider　ourselves；　as　in　the　place　of　the
Supreme　Being；　and　conclude；　that　he　will；　on　every
occasion；　observe　the　same　conduct；　which　we　ourselves；　in
his　situation；　would　have　embraced　as　reasonable　and
eligible。　But；　besides　that　the　ordinary　course　of　nature
may　convince　us；　that　almost　everything　is　regulated　by
principles　and　maxims　very　different　from　ours；　besides
this；　I　say；　it　must　evidently　appear　contrary　to　all　rules
of　analogy　to　reason；　from　the　intentions　and　projects　of
men；　to　those　of　a　Being　so　different；　and　so　much　superior。
In　human　nature；　there　is　a　certain　experienced　coherence　of
designs　and　inclinations；　so　that　when；　from　any　fact；　we
have　discovered　one　intention　of　any　man；　it　may　often　be
reasonable；　from　experience；　to　infer　another；　and　draw　a
long　chain　of　conclusions　concerning　his　past　or　future
conduct。　But　this　method　of　reasoning　can　never　have　place
with　regard　to　a　Being；　so　remote　and　incomprehensible；　who
bears　much　less　analogy　to　any　other　being　in　the　universe
than　the　sun　to　a　waxen　taper；　and　who　discovers　himself
only　by　some　faint　traces　or　outlines；　beyond　which　we　have
no　authority　to　ascribe　to　him　any　attribute　or　perfection。
What　we　imagine　to　be　a　superior　perfection；　may　really　be　a
defect。　Or　were　it　ever　so　much　a　perfection；　the　ascribing
of　it　to　the　Supreme　Being；　where　it　appears　not　to　have
been　really　exerted；　to　the　full；　in　his　works；　savours　more
of　flattery　and　panegyric；　than　of　just　reasoning　and　sound
philosophy。　All　the　philosophy；　therefore；　in　the　world；　and
all　the　religion；　which　is　nothing　but　a　species　of
philosophy；　will　never　be　able　to　carry　us　beyond　the　usual
course　of　experience；　or　give　us　measures　of　conduct　and
behaviour　different　from　those　which　are　furnished　by
reflections　on　common　life。　No　new　fact　can　ever　be　inferred
from　the　religious　hypothesis；　no　event　foreseen　or
foretold；　no　reward　or　punishment　expected　or　dreaded；
beyond　what　is　already　known　by　practice　and　observation。　So
that　my　apology　for　E/PICURUS　will　still　appear　solid　and
satisfactory；　nor　have　the　political　interests　of　society
any　connexion　with　the　philosophical　disputes　concerning
metaphysics　and　religion。

　　　　　There　is