an enquiry concerning human understanding-第19节

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！


in　every　part　of　nature；　there　is　contained　a　vast　variety
of　springs　and　principles；　which　are　hid；　by　reason　of　their
minuteness　or　remoteness；　find；　that　it　is　at　least　possible
the　contrariety　of　events　may　not　proceed　from　any
contingency　in　the　cause；　but　from　the　secret　operation　of
contrary　causes。　This　possibility　is　converted　into
certainty　by　farther　observation；　when　they　remark　that；
upon　an　exact　scrutiny；　a　contrariety　of　effects　always
betrays　a　contrariety　of　causes；　and　proceeds　from　their
mutual　opposition。　A　peasant　can　give　no　better　reason　for
the　stopping　of　any　clock　or　watch　than　to　say　that　it　does
not　commonly　go　right：　But　an　artist　easily　perceives　that
the　same　force　in　the　spring　or　pendulum　has　always　the　same
influence　on　the　wheels；　but　fails　of　its　usual　effects；
perhaps　by　reason　of　a　grain　of　dust；　which　puts　a　stop　to
the　whole　movement。　From　the　observation　of　several　parallel
instances；　philosophers　form　a　maxim　that　the　connexion
between　all　causes　and　effects　is　equally　necessary；　and
that　its　seeming　uncertainty　in　some　instances　proceeds　from
the　secret　opposition　of　contrary　causes。

　　　　　Thus；　for　instance；　in　the　human　body；　when　the　usual
symptoms　of　health　or　sickness　disappoint　our　expectation；
when　medicines　operate　not　with　their　wonted　powers；　when
irregular　events　follow　from　any　particular　cause；　the
philosopher　and　physician　are　not　surprised　at　the　matter；
nor　are　ever　tempted　to　deny；　in　general；　the　necessity　and
uniformity　of　those　principles　by　which　the　animal　economy
is　conducted。　They　know　that　a　human　body　is　a　mighty
complicated　machine：　That　many　secret　powers　lurk　in　it；
which　are　altogether　beyond　our　comprehension：　That　to　us　it
must　often　appear　very　uncertain　in　its　operations：　And　that
therefore　the　irregular　events；　which　outwardly　discover
themselves；　can　be　no　proof　that　the　laws　of　nature　are　not
observed　with　the　greatest　regularity　in　its　internal
operations　and　government。

　　　　　The　philosopher；　if　he　be　consistent；　must　apply　the
same　reasoning　to　the　actions　and　volitions　of　intelligent
agents。　The　most　irregular　and　unexpected　resolutions　of　men
may　frequently　be　accounted　for　by　those　who　know　every
particular　circumstance　of　their　character　and　situation。　A
person　of　an　obliging　disposition　gives　a　peevish　answer：
But　he　has　the　toothache；　or　has　not　dined。　A　stupid　fellow
discovers　an　uncommon　alacrity　in　his　carriage：　But　he　has
met　with　a　sudden　piece　of　good　fortune。　Or　even　when　an
action；　as　sometimes　happens；　cannot　be　particularly
accounted　for；　either　by　the　person　himself　or　by　others；　we
know；　in　general；　that　the　characters　of　men　are；　to　a
certain　degree；　inconstant　and　irregular。　This　is；　in　a
manner；　the　constant　character　of　human　nature；　though　it　be
applicable；　in　a　more　particular　manner；　to　some　persons　who
have　no　fixed　rule　for　their　conduct；　but　proceed　in　a
continued　course　of　caprice　and　inconstancy。　The　internal
principles　and　motives　may　operate　in　a　uniform　manner；
notwithstanding　these　seeming　irregularities；　in　the　same
manner　as　the　winds；　rain；　cloud；　and　other　variations　of
the　weather　are　supposed　to　be　governed　by　steady
principles；　though　not　easily　discoverable　by　human　sagacity
and　enquiry。

　　　　　Thus　it　appears；　not　only　that　the　conjunction　between
motives　and　voluntary　actions　is　as　regular　and　uniform　as
that　between　the　cause　and　effect　in　any　part　of　nature；　but
also　that　this　regular　conjunction　has　been　universally
acknowledged　among　mankind；　and　has　never　been　the　subject
of　dispute；　either　in　philosophy　or　common　life。　Now；　as　it
is　from　past　experience　that　we　draw　all　
concerning　the　future；　and　as　we　conclude　that　objects　will
always　be　conjoined　together　which　we　find　to　have　always
been　conjoined；　it　may　seem　superfluous　to　prove　that　this
experienced　uniformity　in　human　actions　is　a　source　whence
we　draw　inferences　concerning　them。　But　in　order　to　throw
the　argument　into　a　greater　variety　of　lights　we　shall　also
insist；　though　briefly；　on　this　latter　topic。

　　　　　The　mutual　dependence　of　men　is　so　great　in　all
societies　that　scarce　any　human　action　is　entirely　complete
in　itself；　or　is　performed　without　some　reference　to　the
actions　of　others；　which　are　requisite　to　make　it　answer
fully　the　intention　of　the　agent。　The　poorest　artificer；　who
labours　alone；　expects　at　least　the　protection　of　the
magistrate；　to　ensure　him　the　enjoyment　of　the　fruits　of　his
labour。　He　also　expects　that；　when　he　carries　his　goods　to
market；　and　offers　them　at　a　reasonable　price；　he　shall　find
purchasers；　and　shall　be　able；　by　the　money　he　acquires；　to
engage　others　to　supply　him　with　those　commodities　which　are
requisite　for　his　subsistence。　In　proportion　as　men　extend
their　dealings；　and　render　their　intercourse　with　others
more　complicated；　they　always　comprehend；　in　their　schemes
of　life；　a　greater　variety　of　voluntary　actions；　which　they
expect；　from　the　proper　motives；　to　co…　operate　with　their
own。　In　all　these　conclusions　they　take　their　measures　from
past　experience；　in　the　same　manner　as　in　their　reasonings
concerning　external　objects；　and　firmly　believe　that　men；　as
well　as　all　the　elements；　are　to　continue；　in　their
operations；　the　same　that　they　have　ever　found　them。　A
manufacturer　reckons　upon　the　labour　of　his　servants　for　the
execution　of　any　work　as　much　as　upon　the　tools　which　he
employs；　and　would　be　equally　surprised　were　his
expectations　disappointed。　In　short；　this　experimental
inference　and　reasoning　concerning　the　actions　of　others
enters　so　much　into　human　life　that　no　man；　while　awake；　is
ever　a　moment　without　employing　it。　Have　we　not　reason；
therefore；　to　affirm　that　all　mankind　have　always　agreed　in
the　doctrine　of　necessity　according　to　the　foregoing
definition　and　explication　of　it？

　　　　　Nor　have　philosophers　even　entertained　a　different
opinion　from　the　people　in　this　particular。　For；　not　to
mention　that　almost　every　action　of　their　life　supposes　that
opinion；　there　are　even　few　of　the　speculative　parts　of
learning　to　which　it　is　not　essential。　What　would　become　of
；　had　we　not　a　dependence　on　the　veracity　of　the
historian　according　to　the　experience　which　we　have　had　of
mankind？　How　could　　be　a　science；　if　laws　and
forms　of　government　had　not　a　uniform　influence　upon
society？　Where　would　be　the　foundation　of　；　if
particular　characters　had　no　certain　or　determinate　power　to
produce　particular　sentiments；　and　if　these　sentiments　had
no　constant　operation　on　actions？　And　with　what　pretence
could　we　employ　our　　upon　any　poet　or　polite
author；　if　we　could　not　pronounce　the　conduct　and　sentiments
of　his　actors　either　natural　or　unnatural　to　such
characters；　and　in　such　circumstances？　It　seems　almost
impossible；　therefore；　to　engage　either　in　science　or　action
of　any　kind　without　acknowledging　the　doctrine　of　necessity；
and　this　　from　motive　to　voluntary　actions；　from
characters　to　conduct。

　　　　　And　indeed；　when　we　consider　how　aptly　　and
　evidence　link　together；　and　form　only　one　chain　of
argument；　we　shall　make　no　scruple　to　allow　that　they　are　of
the　same　nature；　and　derived　from　the　same　principles。　A
prisoner　who　has　neither　money　nor　interest；　discovers　the
impossibility　of　his　escape；　as　well　when　he　considers　the
obstinacy　of　the　gaoler；　as　the　walls　and　bars　with　which　he
is　surrounded；　and；　in　all　attempts　for　his　freedom；　chooses
rather　to　work　upon　the　stone　and　iron　of　the　one；　than　upon
the　inflexible　nature　of　the　other。　The　same　prisoner；　when
conducted　to　the　scaffold；　foresees　his　death　as　certainly
from　the　constancy　and　fidelity　of　his　guards；　as　from　the
operation　of　the　axe　or　wheel。　His　mind　runs　along　a　certain
train　of　ideas：　The　refusal　of　the　soldiers　to　consent　to
his　escape；　the　action　of　the　executioner；　the　separation　of
the　head　and　body；　bleeding；　convulsive　motions；　and　death。
Here　is　a　connected　chain　of　natural　causes　and　voluntary
actions；　but　the　mind　feels　no　difference　between　them　in
passing　from　one　link　to　another：　Nor　is　it　less　certain　of
the　future　event　than　if　it　were　connected　with　the　objects
present　to　the　memory　or　senses；　by　a　train　of　causes；
cemented　together　by　what　we　are　pleased　to　call　a
　necessity。　The　same　experienced　union　has　the
same　effect　on　the　mind；　whether　the　united　objects　be
motives；　volition；　and　actions；　or　figure　and　motion。　We　may
change　the　name　of　things；　but　their　nature　and　their
operation　on　the　understanding　never　change。

　　　　　Were　a　man；　whom　I　know　to　be　honest　and　opulent；　and
with　whom　I　live　in　intimate　friendship；　to　come　into　my
house；　where　I　am　surrounded　with　my　servants；　I　rest
assured　that　he　is　not　to　stab　me　before　he　leaves　it　in
order　to　rob　me　of　my　silver　standish；　and　I　no　more　suspect
this　event　than　the　falling　of　the　house　itself；　which　is
new；　and　solidly　built　and　founded。　　。　　So　may　a　sudden
earthquake　arise；　and　shake　and　tumble　my　house　about　my
ears。　I　shall　therefore　change　the