an enquiry concerning human understanding-第14节

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reality；　there　is　scarcely　a　proposition　in　E/UCLID　so
simple；　as　not　to　consist　of　more　parts；　than　are　to　be
found　in　any　moral　reasoning　which　runs　not　into　chimera　and
conceit。　Where　we　trace　the　principles　of　the　human　mind
through　a　few　steps；　we　may　be　very　well　satisfied　with　our
progress；　considering　how　soon　nature　throws　a　bar　to　all
our　enquiries　concerning　causes；　and　reduces　us　to　an
acknowledgment　of　our　ignorance。　The　chief　obstacle；
therefore；　to　our　improvement　in　the　moral　or　metaphysical
sciences　is　the　obscurity　of　the　ideas；　and　ambiguity　of　the
terms。　The　principal　difficulty　in　the　mathematics　is　the
length　of　inferences　and　compass　of　thought；　requisite　to
the　forming　of　any　conclusion。　And；　perhaps；　our　progress　in
natural　philosophy　is　chiefly　retarded　by　the　want　of　proper
experiments　and　phaenomena；　which　are　often　discovered　by
chance；　and　cannot　always　be　found；　when　requisite；　even　by
the　most　diligent　and　prudent　enquiry。　As　moral　philosophy
seems　hitherto　to　have　received　less　improvement　than　either
geometry　or　physics；　we　may　conclude；　that；　if　there　be　any
difference　in　this　respect　among　these　sciences；　the
difficulties；　which　obstruct　the　progress　of　the　former；
require　superior　care　and　capacity　to　be　surmounted。

　　　　　There　are　no　ideas；　which　occur　in　metaphysics；　more
obscure　and　uncertain；　than　those　of　；　；
　or　；　of　which　it　is　every
moment　necessary　for　us　to　treat　in　all　our　disquisitions。
We　shall；　therefore；　endeavour；　in　this　section；　to　fix；　if
possible；　the　precise　meaning　of　these　terms；　and　thereby
remove　some　part　of　that　obscurity；　which　is　so　much
complained　of　in　this　species　of　philosophy。

　　　　　It　seems　a　proposition；　which　will　not　admit　of　much
dispute；　that　all　our　ideas　are　nothing　but　copies　of　our
impressions；　or；　in　other　words；　that　it　is　impossible　for
us　to　　of　any　thing；　which　we　have　not　antecedently
；　either　by　our　external　or　internal　senses。　I　have
endeavoured＇15＇　to　explain　and　prove　this　proposition；　and
have　expressed　my　hopes；　that；　by　a　proper　application　of
it；　men　may　reach　a　greater　clearness　and　precision　in
philosophical　reasonings；　than　what　they　have　hitherto　been
able　to　attain。　Complex　ideas；　may；　perhaps；　be　well　known
by　definition；　which　is　nothing　but　an　enumeration　of　those
parts　or　simple　ideas；　that　compose　them。　But　when　we　have
pushed　up　definitions　to　the　most　simple　ideas；　and　find
still　more　ambiguity　and　obscurity；　what　resource　are　we
then　possessed　of？　By　what　invention　can　we　throw　light　upon
these　ideas；　and　render　them　altogether　precise　and
determinate　to　our　intellectual　view？　Produce　the
impressions　or　original　sentiments；　from　which　the　ideas　are
copied。　These　impressions　are　all　strong　and　sensible。　They
admit　not　of　ambiguity。　They　are　not　only　placed　in　a　full
light　themselves；　but　may　throw　light　on　their　correspondent
ideas；　which　lie　in　obscurity。　And　by　this　means；　we　may；
perhaps；　attain　a　new　microscope　or　species　of　optics；　by
which；　in　the　moral　sciences；　the　most　minute；　and　most
simple　ideas　may　be　so　enlarged　as　to　fall　readily　under　our
apprehension；　and　be　equally　known　with　the　grossest　and
most　sensible　ideas；　that　can　be　the　object　of　our　enquiry。

　　　　　To　be　fully　acquainted；　therefore；　with　the　idea　of
power　or　necessary　connexion；　let　us　examine　its　impression；
and　in　order　to　find　the　impression　with　greater　certainty；
let　us　search　for　it　in　all　the　sources；　from　which　it　may
possibly　be　derived。

　　　　　When　we　look　about　us　towards　external　objects；　and
consider　the　operation　of　causes；　we　are　never　able；　in　a
single　instance；　to　discover　any　power　or　necessary
connexion；　any　quality；　which　binds　the　effect　to　the　cause；
and　renders　the　one　an　infallible　consequence　of　the　other。
We　only　find；　that　the　one　does　actually；　in　fact；　follow
the　other。　The　impulse　of　one　billiard…　ball　is　attended
with　motion　in　the　second。　This　is　the　whole　that　appears　to
the　　senses。　The　mind　feels　no　sentiment　or
　impression　from　this　succession　of　objects：
Consequently；　there　is　not；　in　any　single；　particular
instance　of　cause　and　effect；　any　thing　which　can　suggest
the　idea　of　power　or　necessary　connexion。

　　　　　From　the　first　appearance　of　an　object；　we　never　can
conjecture　what　effect　will　result　from　it。　But　were　the
power　or　energy　of　any　cause　discoverable　by　the　mind；　we
could　foresee　the　effect；　even　without　experience；　and
might；　at　first；　pronounce　with　certainty　concerning　it；　by
mere　dint　of　thought　and　reasoning。

　　　　　In　reality；　there　is　no　part　of　matter；　that　does　ever；
by　its　sensible　qualities；　discover　any　power　or　energy；　or
give　us　ground　to　imagine；　that　it　could　produce　any　thing；
or　be　followed　by　any　other　object；　which　we　could
denominate　its　effect。　Solidity；　extension；　motion；　these
qualities　are　all　complete　in　themselves；　and　never　point
out　any　other　event　which　may　result　from　them。　The　scenes
of　the　universe　are　continually　shifting；　and　one　object
follows　another　in　an　uninterrupted　succession；　but　the
power　of　force；　which　actuates　the　whole　machine；　is
entirely　concealed　from　us；　and　never　discovers　itself　in
any　of　the　sensible　qualities　of　body。　We　know　that；　in
fact；　heat　is　a　constant　attendant　of　flame；　but　what　is　the
connexion　between　them；　we　have　no　room　so　much　as　to
conjecture　or　imagine。　It　is　impossible；　therefore；　that　the
idea　of　power　can　be　derived　from　the　contemplation　of
bodies；　in　single　instances　of　their　operation；　because　no
bodies　ever　discover　any　power；　which　can　be　the　original　of
this　idea。＇16＇

　　　　　Since；　therefore；　external　objects　as　they　appear　to
the　senses；　give　us　no　idea　of　power　or　necessary　connexion；
by　their　operation　in　particular　instances；　let　us　see；
whether　this　idea　be　derived　from　reflection　on　the
operations　of　our　own　minds；　and　be　copied　from　any　internal
impression。　It　may　be　said；　that　we　are　every　moment
conscious　of　internal　power；　while　we　feel；　that；　by　the
simple　command　of　our　will；　we　can　move　the　organs　of　our
body；　or　direct　the　faculties　of　our　mind。　An　act　of
volition　produces　motion　in　our　limbs；　or　raises　a　new　idea
in　our　imagination。　This　influence　of　the　will　we　know　by
consciousness。　Hence　we　acquire　the　idea　of　power　or　energy；
and　are　certain；　that　we　ourselves　and　all　other　intelligent
beings　are　possessed　of　power。　This　idea；　then；　is　an　idea
of　reflection；　since　it　arises　from　reflecting　on　the
operations　of　our　own　mind；　and　on　the　command　which　is
exercised　by　will；　both　over　the　organs　of　the　body　and
faculties　of　the　soul。

　　　　　We　shall　proceed　to　examine　this　pretension；　and　first
with　regard　to　the　influence　of　volition　over　the　organs　of
the　body。　This　influence；　we　may　observe；　is　a　fact；　which；
like　all　other　natural　events；　can　be　known　only　by
experience；　and　can　never　be　foreseen　from　any　apparent
energy　or　power　in　the　cause；　which　connects　it　with　the
effect；　and　renders　the　one　an　infallible　consequence　of　the
other。　The　motion　of　our　body　follows　upon　the　command　of
our　will。　Of　this　we　are　every　moment　conscious。　But　the
means；　by　which　this　is　effected；　the　energy；　by　which　the
will　performs　so　extraordinary　an　operation；　of　this　we　are
so　far　from　being　immediately　conscious；　that　it　must　for
ever　escape　our　most　diligent　enquiry。

　　　　　For　；　is　there　any　principle　in　all　nature　more
mysterious　than　the　union　of　soul　with　body；　by　which　a
supposed　spiritual　substance　acquires　such　an　influence　over
a　material　one；　that　the　most　refined　thought　is　able　to
actuate　the　grossest　matter？　Were　we　empowered；　by　a　secret
wish；　to　remove　mountains；　or　control　the　planets　in　their
orbit；　this　extensive　authority　would　not　be　more
extraordinary；　nor　more　beyond　our　comprehension。　But　if　by
consciousness　we　perceived　any　power　or　energy　in　the　will；
we　must　know　this　power；　we　must　know　its　connexion　with　the
effect；　we　must　know　the　secret　union　of　soul　and　body；　and
the　nature　of　both　these　substances；　by　which　the　one　is
able　to　operate；　in　so　many　instances；　upon　the　other。

　　　　　；　We　are　not　able　to　move　all　the　organs　of
the　body　with　a　like　authority；　though　we　cannot　assign　any
reason　besides　experience；　for　so　remarkable　a　difference
between　one　and　the　other。　Why　has　the　will　an　influence
over　the　tongue　and　fingers；　not　over　the　heart　or　liver？
This　question　would　never　embarrass　us；　were　we　conscious　of
a　power　in　the　former　case；　not　in　the　latter。　We　should
then　perceive；　independent　of　experience；　why　the　authority
of　will　over　the　organs　of　the　body　is　circumscribed　within
such　particular　limits。　Being　in　that　case　fully　acquainted
with　the　power　or　force；　by　which　it　operates；　we　should
also　know；　why　its　influence　reaches　precisely　to　such
boundaries；　and　no　farther。

　　　　　A　man；　suddenly　struck　with　palsy　in　the　leg　or　arm；　or
who　had　newly　lost　those　members；　frequently　endeavours；　at
first　to　move　them；　and　employ　them；　in　their　usual　offices。
Here　he　is　as　much　conscious　of　power　to　command　such　limbs；
as　a　man　in　perfect　hea