personal memoirs-2-第8节

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enemy's　infantry　at　Fisher's　Hill；　and　the　receipt；　the　night　before；

of　the　following　despatch；　which　again　opened　the　question　of　an

advance　on　Gordonsville　and　Charlottesville：





（Cipher。）

〃WASHINGTON；　October　12；　1864；　12　M。



〃MAJOR…GENERAL　SHERIDAN：



〃Lieutenant…General　Grant　wishes　a　position　taken　far　enough　south　to

serve　as　a　base　for　further　operations　upon　Gordonsville　and

Charlottesville。　　It　must　be　strongly　fortified　and　provisioned。

Some　point　in　the　vicinity　of　Manassas　Gap　would　seem　best　suited　for

all　purposes。　　Colonel　Alexander；　of　the　Engineers；　will　be　sent　to

consult　with　you　as　soon　as　you　connect　with　General　Augur。



〃H。　　W。　　HALLECK；　Major…General。〃





As　it　was　well　known　in　Washington　that　the　views　expressed　in　the

above　despatch　were　counter　to　my　convictions；　I　was　the　next　day

required　by　the　following　telegram　from　Secretary　Stanton　to　repair

to　that　city　：





〃　WASHINGTON；　October　13；　1864。



〃MAJOR…GENERAL　SHERIDAN

（through　General　Augur）



〃If　you　can　come　here；　a　consultation　on　several　points　is　extremely

desirable。　　I　propose　to　visit　General　Grant；　and　would　like　to　see

you　first。



〃EDWIN　M。　　STANTON；

〃Secretary　of　War。〃





I　got　all　ready　to　comply　with　the　terms　of　Secretary　Stanton's

despatch；　but　in　the　meantime　the　enemy　appeared　in　my　front　in

force；　with　infantry　and　cavalry；　and　attacked　Colonel　Thoburn；　who

had　been　pushed　out　toward　Strasburg　from　Crook's　command；　and　also

Custer's　division　of　cavalry　on　the　Back　road。　　As　afterward

appeared；　this　attack　was　made　in　the　belief　that　all　of　my　troops

but　Crook's　had　gone　to　Petersburg。　　From　this　demonstration　there

ensued　near　Hupp's　Hill　a　bitter　skirmish　between　Kershaw　and

Thoburn；　and　the　latter　was　finally　compelled　to　withdraw　to　the

north　bank　of　Cedar　Creek。　　Custer　gained　better　results；　however；　on

the　Back　road；　with　his　usual　dash　driving　the　enemy's　cavalry　away

from　his　front；　Merritt's　division　then　joining　him　and　remaining　on

the　right。



The　day's　events　pointing　to　a　probability　that　the　enemy　intended　to

resume　the　offensive；　to　anticipate　such　a　contingency　I　ordered　the

Sixth　Corps　to　return　from　its　march　toward　Ashby's　Gap。　　It　reached

me　by　noon　of　the　14th；　and　went　into　position　to　the　right　and　rear

of　the　Nineteenth　Corps；　which　held　a　line　along　the　north　bank　of

Cedar　Creek；　west　of　the　Valley　pike。　　Crook　was　posted　on　the　left

of　the　Nineteenth　Corps　and　east　of　the　Valley　pike；　with　Thoburn's

division　advanced　to　a　round　hill；　which　commanded　the　junction　of

Cedar　Creek　and　the　Shenandoah　River；　while　Torbert　retained　both

Merritt　and　Custer　on　the　right　of　the　Sixth　Corps；　and　at　the　same

time　covered　with　Powell　the　roads　toward　Front　Royal。　　My　head…

quarters　were　at　the　Belle　Grove　House；　which　was　to　the　west　of　the

pike　and　in　rear　of　the　Nineteenth　Corps。　　It　was　my　intention　to

attack　the　enemy　as　soon　as　the　Sixth　Corps　reached　me；　but　General

Early　having　learned　from　his　demonstration　that　I　had　not　detached

as　largely　as　his　previous　information　had　led　him　to　believe；　on　the

night　of　the　13th　withdrew　to　Fisher's　Hill；　so；　concluding　that　he

could　not　do　us　serious　hurt　from　there；　I　changed　my　mind　as　to

attacking；　deciding　to　defer　such　action　till　I　could　get　to

Washington；　and　come　to　some　definite　understanding　about　my　future

operations。



To　carry　out　this　idea；　on　the　evening　of　the　15th　I　ordered　all　of

the　cavalry　under　General　Torbert　to　accompany　me　to　Front　Royal；

again　intending　to　push　it　thence　through　Chester　Gap　to　the　Virginia

Central　railroad　at　Charlottesville；　to　destroy　the　bridge　over　the

Rivanna　River；　while　I　passed　through　Manassas　Gap　to　Rectortown；　and

thence　by　rail　to　Washington。　　On　my　arrival　with　the　cavalry　near

Front　Royal　on　the　16th；　I　halted　at　the　house　of　Mrs。　Richards；　on

the　north　bank　of　the　river；　and　there　received　the　following

despatch　and　inclosure　from　General　Wright；　who　had　been　left　in

command　at　Cedar　Creek　：



〃HEADQUARTERS　MIDDLE　MILITARY　Division；

〃October　16；　1864。



〃GENERAL：



〃I　enclose　you　despatch　which　explains　itself。　　If　the　enemy　should

be　strongly　reenforced　in　cavalry；　he　might；　by　turning　our　right；

give　us　a　great　deal　of　trouble。　　I　shall　hold　on　here　until　the

enemy's　movements　are　developed；　and　shall　only　fear　an　attack　on　my

right；　which　I　shall　make　every　preparation　for　guarding　against　and

resisting。



〃Very　respectfully；　your　obedient　servant；



〃H。　　G。　　WRIGHT；　Major…General　Commanding。

〃MAJOR…GENERAL　P。　H。　SHERIDAN；

〃Commanding　Middle　Military　Division。〃





＇INCLOSURE。＇　〃To　LIEUTENANT…GENERAL　EARLY：



〃Be　ready　to　move　as　soon　as　my　forces　join　you；　and　we　will　crush

Sheridan。



〃LONGSTREET；　Lieutenant…General。〃





The　message　from　Longstreet　had　been　taken　down　as　it　was　being

flagged　from　the　Confederate　signal…station　on　Three　Top　Mountain；

and　afterward　translated　by　our　signal　officers；　who　knew　the

Confederate　signal　code。　　I　first　thought　it　a　ruse；　and　hardly　worth

attention；　but　on　reflection　deemed　it　best　to　be　on　the　safe　side；

so　I　abandoned　the　cavalry　raid　toward　Charlottesville；　in　order　to

give　General　Wright　the；　entire　strength　of　the　army；　for　it　did　not

seem　wise　to　reduce　his　numbers　while　reinforcement　for　the　enemy

might　be　near；　and　especially　when　such　pregnant　messages　were

reaching　Early　from　one　of　the　ablest　of　the　Confederate　generals。

Therefore　I　sent　the　following　note　to　General　Wright：　　　　　　I



〃HEADQUARTERS　MIDDLE　MILITARY　DIVISION；

〃Front　Royal；　October　16；　x864。



〃GENERAL：　The　cavalry　is　all　ordered　back　to　you；　make　your　position

strong。　　If　Longstreet's　despatch　is　true；　he　is　under　the　impression

that　we　have　largely　detached。　　I　will　go　over　to　Augur；　and　may　get

additional　news。　　Close　in　Colonel　Powell；　who　will　be　at　this　point。

If　the　enemy　should　make　an　advance；　I　know　you　will　defeat　him。

Look　well　to　your　ground　and　be　well　prepared。　　Get　up　everything

that　can　be　spared。　　I　will　bring　up　all　I　can；　and　will　be　up　on

Tuesday；　if　not　sooner。



〃P。　H。　SHERIDAN；　Major…General。



〃MAJOR…GENERAL　H。　　G。　　WRIGHT；

〃Commanding　Sixth　Army　Corps。〃





At　5　o'clock　on　the　evening　of　the　16th　I　telegraphed　General　Halleck

from　Rectortown；　giving　him　the　information　which　had　come　to　me　from

Wright；　asking　if　anything　corroborative　of　it　had　been　received　from

General　Grant；　and　also　saying　that　I　would　like　to　see　Halleck；　the

telegram　ending　with　the　question：　〃Is　it　best　for　me　to　go　to　see

you？〃　　Next　morning　I　sent　back　to　Wright　all　the　cavalry　except　one

regiment；　which　escorted　me　through　Manassas　Gap　to　the　terminus　of

the　railroad　from　Washington。　　I　had　with　me　Lieutenant…Colonel　James

W。　　Forsyth；　chief…of…staff；　and　three　of　my　aides；　Major　George　A。

Forsyth；　Captain　Joseph　O'Keefe；　and　Captain　Michael　V。　Sheridan。　　I

rode　my　black　horse；　Rienzi；　and　the　others　their　own　respective

mounts。



Before　leaving　Cedar　Creek　I　had　fixed　the　route　of　my　return　to　be

by　rail　from　Washington　to　Martinsburg；　and　thence　by　horseback　to

Winchester　and　Cedar　Creek；　and　had　ordered　three　hundred　cavalry　to

Martinsburg　to　escort　me　from　that　point　to　the　front。　　At　Rectortown

I　met　General　Augur；　who　had　brought　a　force　out　from　Washington　to

reconstruct　and　protect　the　line　of　railroad；　and　through　him

received　the　following　reply　from　General　Halleck：



〃HEADQUARTERS　ARMIES　OF　THE　UNITED　STATES；

〃WASHINGTON；　D。C。；　October　16　1864



〃To　MAJOR…GENERAL　SHERIDAN；

〃Rectortown；　Va。



General　Grant　says　that　Longstreet　brought　with　him　no　troops　from

Richmond；　but　I　have　very　little　confidence　in　the　information

collected　at　his　headquarters。　　If　you　can　leave　your　command　with

safety；　come　to　Washington；　as　I　wish　to　give　you　the　views　of　the

authorities　here。



〃H。　W。　HALLECK；　Major…General；　Chief…of…Staff。





In　consequence　of　the　Longstreet　despatch；　I　felt　a　concern　about　my

absence　which　I　could　hardly　repress；　but　after　duly　considering　what

Halleck　said；　and　believing　that　Longstreet　could　not　unite　with

Early　before　I　got　back；　and　that　even　if　he　did　Wright　would　be　able

to　cope　with　them　both；　I　and　my　staff；　with　our　horses；　took　the

cars　for　Washington；　where　we　arrived　on　the　morning　of　the　17th　at

about　8　o'clock。　　I　proceeded　at　an　early　hour　to　the　War　Department；

and　as　soon　as　I　met　Secretary　Stanton；　asked　him　for　a　special　train

to　be　ready　at　12　o'clock　to　take　me　to　Martinsburg；　saying　that　in

view　of　existing　conditions　I　must　get　back　to　my　army　as　quickly　as

possible。　　He　at　once　gave　the　order　for　the　train；　and　then　the

Secretary；　Halleck；　and　I　proceeded　to　hold　a　consultation　in　regard

to　my　operating　east　of　the　Blue　Ridge。　　The　upshot　was　that　my　views

against　such　a　plan　were　practically　agreed　to；　and　two　engine